Standing Well Back

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Explosives Protecting Surveillance Devices and Micro IEDs

Interesting development reported here and elsewhere   Basically a covert electronic surveillance device was discovered somehwere ‘interesting” in Iran which seemed to have had a Victim operated explosive penalty integral to it.  Poses interesting theoretical challenges for security staff and potential EOD response needed to a find of a suspected surveillance device.

Reportedly similar devices were discovered over the past couple of years in Lebanon, monitoring phone lines, and an associated explosive incident occurred, but it’s not entirely clear if the explosion in that case was directly integral to the surveillance device or dropped from the sky.

Of course there is a common likely perpertrator in both the Lebanese and Iranian incidents, but the potential threat of an explosive device to reduce the evidence associated with the electronic eavesdropping remains whoever the perpertrator is.

I think there are also some intreresting deeper aspects to this, namely:

a. Is the purpose to deter searchers?

b. Or to destroy sensitive components? – if so what’s so sensitive that it needs destroying?

c. How would your design a surveillance device with an associated explosive payload so that it was certain to destroy the component you are concerned about.

d. What are the EOD implications of such a design.

Seperately, the fascinating accusations that Siemens components sold to Iran had small quantities of explosives (and presumably an initiation system) hidden within them is intruiging. Siemens deny even selling the components. But let’s guess that someone in the West provided a component with hidden micro devices in them for sabotage…. and that’s a fascinating concept.

 

 

EOD responses

Why don’t we investigate “near misses” on EOD operations?

Interesting article here about the psychology of “near misses”.  It’s human nature to think that a project is a great success even if total disaster was missed by a fraction.

I think there’s an interesting corollary here for EOD operations. Most countries have an investigation system for examining when there’s an incident that kills or injures an EOD operator or bomb disposal technician. But if the operator is “lucky” and escapes unscathed there’s often no such investigation… and as the article points out, the individuals involved tend to repeat their potentially disastrous behaviour.  To quote from the link “People don’t learn from a near miss, they just say “it worked, lets do it again.””  Ok ,there are the occasional exceptions, but on a global basis I think the statement there is no investigation of near misses is true as generalisation.

I’m fascinated that the FAA has addressed their problems in the area of “near misses” by analyzing the issues and pre-emptively fixing them so that there has been an 83% drop in fatalities over the past decade.

So… how do we collect and analyse the “near miss” data from EOD operations? (And you know that generally the answer is that we don’t). I think partly there is a culture in bomb techs globally to avoid such activity and partly there are frankly weak oversight structures over most EOD units.  That’s provocative I know but I stand by what I’m saying – argue me back if you wish.

One of the facts quoted in the article is that a risk analysis firm suggests that there are between 50 and 100 “near misses’ for every serious accident. Instinctively I wouldn’t be surprised if that stat applies equally to EOD operations.

Most incident investigations of EOD casualties work backwards – I think it’s time the community turned this on its head and EOD organizations get used to trying to spot the near miss. I don’t doubt that would require a huge cultural shift, and collection and analysis of a lot of data but I think it’s needed.

Non EOD interesting stuff

Unutterable Trash

As readers of this blog will know I’m a bit of a fan of those eccentric Englishmen who in history have found a niche undertaking remarkable wartime escapades in the most laid back and casual manner.  I have also been a devourer of travel writing of the best sort. These two passions come together in the person of Patrick Leigh Fermor, the writer and wartime SOE operative.  I’m about to go on a family vacation to Crete so have been re-reading the story of Leigh-Fermor’s kidnapping of General Kreipe and the subsequent exfiltration from that island.  Wonderful stuff and I’m looking forward to seeing the actual scenes.   The book about this escapade was written by Bill Stanley-Moss, Leigh-Fermor’s accomplice and was made into a film in the 1950’s that I’m forcing my sons to watch.  I’m also reading a book “The Cretan Runner” translated by PLF, written by a young Cretan shepherd who was part of the messaging system for the resistance in Crete.

I was doing some idle digging and came across a photographic record of Leigh-Fermor’s wartime files.  Fascinating stuff, and can be seen here.  Seeing these images is like touching history.  A few jump out:

For those unfamiliar with the remarkable man – here’s his Obituary.

19th Century

US Made “Trojan Horse” IED Used Against the British in 1813

Another interesting booby trap IED set by our American cousins against the Brits:

The United States Congress decided to encourage private citizens to get involved in the war effort. In March 1813, they passed legislation encouraging the development of weapons and tactics designed to disrupt the blockade. John Scudder, Jr., a New York businessman, soon rose to the challenge. He outfitted a schooner named “Eagle” with kegs of gunpowder, sulfur, turpentine, and two flintlock firing devices, which were attached to two barrels of flour on deck. If either barrel were to be moved, the entire vessel would be detonated. The boat was filled with a standard load of provisions, then sailed toward the mouth of the Sound.  It arrived off Millstone Point on June 25, 1813, and dropped anchor. The crew headed for shore as a British boarding party approached, then fired on the boat.  The boarding party, to save themselves and the schooner, cut the anchor line and sailed back toward safety. The Americans had planned on this, assuming that the British navy would tie the prize to HMS Ramillies. Instead, the Eagle was tied to another recently captured vessel. That afternoon, one of the flour barrels was moved, causing a massive explosion that destroyed both the Eagle and the boat it was tied to, killing a second lieutenant and ten British sailors in the process.

What is it about these New Yorkers?  : – )

 

1970-1980

Pipe Smoking – Counter-Terrorist EOD in 1974

There’s a nice bit of history available on the BBC iplayer here, a 1974 BBC documentary about the training and operations of EOD operators going to Northern Ireland. Apologies to those of you who can’t access iPlayer outside the UK.

The following comments spring to mind:

  • When did it become unacceptable to turn up for an incident smoking a pipe?  And smoke a pipe during lectures?  : – )
  • Some very snazzy shirts….
  • Some very posh accents especially from the 39 Bde watchkeeper….
  • Is that a very young looking Barry Taylor at the 5.42?  By later in the program he’s grown a Ginge Carrahar droopy moustache…
  • The late great Ron Cooper telling what would now be inappropriate jokes at 17.40
  • Baldrick the dog turns up at 19.00.
  • Stroppy RESA …. :- ) at 29.50

 

Update on Friday, June 15, 2012 at 2:31AM by Roger Davies

I forgot to comment about the SATO working hard to get his mug on camera.  I assume much to the disgust of the very large team on the ground. I also couldn’t work out why he needed one radio to transmit and another to receive…. but then again SATO’s always know best don’t they…. : – )  And to me the berets looked just fine…

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