Standing Well Back

2000-2010

Weirder than weird – Fake bomb detectors now used by Hezbollah

Sometimes it’s simply too difficult to comment.  Here’s today’s example of the “beyond any understanding” category.

A. Over the past few months there have been two trials in the UK of individuals offering fake bomb detectors. The details can be seen here (Gary Bolton) and here (James McCormick).  I can assure you that these bomb detectors are a scam. I know this absolutely, and I’m appalled that people have bought them and indeed still use them. They are not only a scam but a very obvious scam. I don’t doubt that some ignorant people believe in them, but they are wrong, very wrong. There is no scientific reason to support their use. They are a toy sold in a criminal scam that puts lives at risk. Full stop. Period.

B. Today a car bomb was found in a suburb of Beirut known for the presence of Hezbollah. There’s a picture in the news this evening here, showing Hezbollah security staff using a fake bomb detector. Really.

Sometimes the world is too weird for comment.

EOD Psychology

Near-Misses – Lessons from WW2, and a danger highlighted

I’m returning once again to the issue of the need for “near-miss” reporting in the EOD community.  My previous post on the subject is here.

I’ve been digging further and found an interesting study done by a famous Cambridge University psychologist, J T MacCurdy in the 1940s.  MacCurdy studied “The Structure of Morale” as it affected the British population and military during the first part of WW2. One subset he looked at were those who experienced the “Blitz” in London in 1940 and 1941.

MacCurdy theorized that people affected by the blitz fell into three categories:

  • Those who were killed.
  • Those who experienced very closely a bomb explosion. They are in the immediate vicinity – they feel the blast, see the destruction, are horrified by the carnage, perhaps they are wounded, but they survive. They are deeply “impressed” in the sense that there is a powerful reinforcement of the natural fear reaction. The psychological experience is of being faced by death, and the fear is reinforced.
  • The next category, who MacCurdy describes as the “remote-miss” group are one step further removed.  They hear the sirens, they hear the enemy planes, they hear the explosion. But they are unharmed. Psychologically the remote miss is different – the fact that they escaped injury and escaped the devastation lessens fear – the catastrophe was physically remote and so fear is put to one side. In many there builds a feeling of invulnerability and indeed excitement.

Now, while such feelings experienced by the “remote-miss” category were probably instrumental in reducing the effects of the Blitz on the population in Britain at the time, my position is that if you took those three categories and applied them to EOD operators on modern day EOD operations, then the same categories might present themselves.

  • Those operators who are killed. There will, inevitably, be some form of reporting and investigation.
  • Those operators who are injured or actually witness an unintended explosion. Usually there will be some form of investigation.
  • Those operators who experience a near miss, make a mistake but no explosive event occurs. I think this is analogous to MacCurdy’s “remote-miss” group.  Such events are usually not reported or investigated.  Not only does the mistake remain unaddressed, but the operator, perhaps begins to feel invulnerable and that can lead to tragedy, of course.

Instinct and a little experience tells me that that this psychological phenomena of an EOD operator feeling invulnerable after a series of “near misses” may be true.  I believe that an appropriate near miss reporting system could mitigate against this danger.

Some other broader points about near-miss reporting:

  • In terms of human lives, near misses are cheap, sometimes  almost zero-cost learning tools that can be used to prevent injury and death.
  • The number of near misses, compared to fatalities is significant. Typically the aviation industry finds about 600 near-miss incidents to one fatal incident. That’s a hugely useful data set that is currently being ignored in the EOD community and not even collected.

I accept the issue of non-punitive reporting is the nub of the challenge as it faces the EOD community but:

  • The aviation community has confidential near miss reporting systems.
  • The US fire and rescue community has an anonymous near-miss reporting system.
  • There are near-miss reporting systems for nurses and doctors in the healthcare community
  • The British railways system has had a near miss reporting system since 2006.

If these industries and professions can manage such systems, why can’t we?  Are our egos too big?

1910-1920

Kurt Jahnke: the legendary German saboteur

I’ve blogged before about the German sabotage campaign just before the US entered World War 1.    I’ve been digging slowly through much new material with regard to Kurt Jahnke.  Jahnke was one of the key German saboteurs operating in the USA before and during the First World War and along with his close colleague Lothar Witzke and a more distant colleague, Franz Rintelen, they played key roles in the extensive and, in my opinion, largely underestimated or unrecognized, IED campaign and associated disruptive activities in the period. This disruptive campaign involved extensive use of IEDs, biological warfare attacks (anthrax and glanders attacks on US soil), arson, encouraging labor disputes, encouraging Mexico’s entry into the war against the US, etc I’m building extensive files on this campaign, bit by bit.

There’s enough for a couple of books, and frankly I’m a bit overwhelmed and the material demands much more beyond a short blog.  For those of you who haven’t heard of him, here’s a very brief potted history of Jahnke:

  • 1888 Born Gnesen in West Prussia
  • ? Enlisted in the German Navy
  • ? worked in Peking as a member of the International Customs service, possibly as a German Agent
  • 1909 Emigrated to the USA
  • ? Enlisted in the US Marines and served in San Francisco, Pearl Harbor and the Philippines
  • ? Discharged for medical reasons (malaria?)
  • 1912 Posted to the German Consulate in San Francisco as a diplomatic official
  • 1912 onwards – developed connections with China whilst in the San Francisco post
  • 1916. Almost certainly involved in the Black Tom explosion, New Jersey
  • 1916 Strongly suspected of fomenting and encouraging labor strikes in San Francisco
  • 1916 Claimed to be responsible for sinking 14 allied munitions ships
  • 1917 Almost certainly responsible for the Mare Island munitions depot explosion near San Francisco.
  • 1917 Involved in other bombings on the US east Coast
  • 1917 After declaration of war, operated from Mexico with numerous plots
  • 1923 Undertook sabotage attacks against occupying French forces in the Ruhr, Germany
  • 1920’s Possibly involved with official, but secret German collaboration with Russian forces
  • 1920’s Possibly recruited as a Russian agent
  • 1934 Formed the Jahnke Buro , a semi-official intelligence agency, aka “Abteilung Pfeffer” Possibly responsible for handling of a German agent in the US embassy
  • 1939 By this date Jahnke’s “Abteilung Pfeffer” was under direct control of Rudolf Hess.
  • 1941 – After Hess’s flight to Britain he “retired” . Some reports suggest he was fired in 1940
  • 1943? – Tempted out of retirement by Walter Schellenberg, head of the Nazi’s foreign intelligence department to return to intelligence activities.  Suggestions he opened a dialogue with Allied intelligence agencies in 1944
  • 1945 – Fled to Switzerland
  • 1945 – Returned to Germany, arrested and tortured by Russian SMERSH
  • 1945- Killed by SMERSH or perhaps not till 1950… or perhaps not at all… suggestions that he worked for one Russian intelligence agency but was arrested by another in a  turf war. Suspected by everyone of being a double agent of one sort or another.

As one might expect with such a full and complex life, establishing the truth is nigh on impossible.  Certainly Jahnke at times claimed responsibility for things he probably hadn’t done, such as the sinking of the USS San Diego, which he claimed responsibility for to the Russians interrogating him. Other things about Jahnke worth considering, which I’m digging at:

  1. Could he have played a part in the 1916 “Preparedness Day bombing” in San Francisco
  2. If so, could he be involved in the 1921 Wall St bombing (there’s a possible connection)
  3. Details of his sabotage attacks on the Ruhr in 1921
  4. Details of the explosive devices he employed
  5. Details of the China connections
  6. Details of US and UK operations in Mexico to counter his activities (quite a bunch of stories there)

There’s lots more to come.

EOD Psychology

Domino Theory and EOD “Near Miss” investigations

I’ve blogged before about the view that the EOD community should have and embrace a “near miss” reporting process for incidents that don’t result in death or injury but might have.  In conversation with other figures in the EOD world, I sense that the view that such a process should be looked at and encouraged, at last, is growing in momentum.

Other industries such as aviation and the nuclear industry have such processes and a culture that supports it.   The EOD community (normally) only has such a process when injury or death occurs.  My personal view is that that is wrong and means that organizational we don’t benefit from others mistakes. I think it means people die unnecessarily and I think it reflects poorly on our thinking and on the leadership within the community, and is morally untenable.

I know there are contrary views, and I respect them, if not understand them.  I know that the biggest hurdle is cultural and the issues of a career foul if an EOD technician self reports a failure is significant. That’s a key issue that needs addressing. I know that a near miss system also requires a vigorous and effective command and control system to implement and manage this, and leaders, managers, investigator and professionals with deep levels of skill (and pure leadership and moral courage) to implement. I know a “near miss” reporting and investigation system isn’t going to be easy, and will have tricky engagement elements whichever branch of the EOD world it applies to.

Perhaps there are preliminary steps. Perhaps a training course in accident and near accident investigation for EOD unit commanders is a first step.  Ken Falke has developed an excellent concept in the IMPACT program and that perhaps sets a template that might be used for ear misses too.

Everyone has an opinion on this and many of the community are resistant to such radical concepts  – and I do admit that the concept will require radical change.

I don’t think that such a system can be introduced over night, as a diktat.  I think it needs a lot of thought and that a whole lot of work needs doing first. My understanding is that some of the professional institutes are interested in funding some academic work, maybe a PhD, to analyse this more carefully, hopefully resulting in recommendations that would inform future systems, and that would be great. I think there’s a lot of work than can be done to extend and build on the work being done to improve the current investigative and lessons learned processes that apply to injuries and deaths into those that are “near misses”.

A “near miss” is simply an accident that occurred but by perhaps chance caused no injury. Who can honestly claim that they don’t want to know the causes of that accident, whether it caused an injury or not?  Let me address one point here. It is very rare, I think, that accidents and near misses of any kind are caused by single point failure. There’s a sort of “domino” theory of accidents, with a whole chain of faults or failures, often, before the final step.  As EOD professionals I think it a greater awareness of the context of a near miss, of the other dominos in the chain which resulted in either a fatality or an accident OR a near miss are vitally important.  Those other dominos might involve:

–       Poor quality of training (content , design or delivery)

–       Ineffective tool capability (hence identifying equipment requirements)

–       Procedural inadequacies

–       Unknown technical challenges presented by ordnance or IEDs

–       Poor operator choices, mental or physical condition

–       Poor operational command issues

–       Poor communications

–       Poor intelligence

–       Contributing causes from a whole host of other areas.

So almost all the time , risks to EOD technicians and operators are complex and are not simply a direct relationship to operator capability.  Identification and characterization of all the other contributing causes for accidents and near accidents I think can valuably lead to improved professionalism and save lives.

This is an important an emotive issue, and I’m very open to publishing alternate views from others in the community, as is, with no edit from me. Fire away.

Non EOD interesting stuff

Eccentric Military Umbrellas

My occasional diversions from the explosive world on this blog have had some recent attention, and this has encouraged me to distill some more stories of eccentric and brave British Army officers.  Here’s two , with the common theme of Umbrellas. The links are well worth reading, trust me.

Major Allison Digby Tatham Warner was a company commander in the Parachute Regiment in Arnhem in 1944.  During the heavy fighting that followed, Digby could often be seen calmly strolling about the defences, seemingly oblivious to the constant threat of mortar barrages and sniper fire. Choosing to wear his red beret in place of a helmet and swinging his trademark umbrella as he went, Tatham-Warter, no matter how desperate the situation became, never failed in his ability to remain unconcerned and to encourage those around him. Even old hands like major Freddie Gough became disheartened when Mark IV Tanks crossed the Bridge and the battle seemed lost, but his gloom lifted instantly when he caught sight of Digby leading a bayonet charge against German infantry who had dared to enter British territory; carrying a pistol in one hand, madly swinging his umbrella about his head with the other, and now sporting a bowler hat on his head – which he had obtained from God knows where – doing his best to look like Charlie Chaplin. On another occasion he used the rolled up umbrella to in-effect disable a German armoured car, simply by thrusting it through an observation slit in the vehicle and incapacitating the driver.  Tatham-Warter later revealed that he carried the umbrella because he could never remember the password, and it would be quite obvious to anyone that the bloody fool carrying the umbrella could only be an Englishman.

AD Wintle, was an officer in the first and second world war. There are too many excellent stories, so follow the link and enjoy.  I love, most of all, that after his encouragement while their prisoner, an entire garrison of Vichy French soldiers defected to the Resistance, after he had escaped from their custody (and had told them he would do so).  To encourage you to follow the link, here’s some quotes:

It may have escaped your attention, but there is no fighting to be done in England.” (on being told he was being removed from active duty against his will following an injury)

No true gentleman would ever unfurl one.” (his umbrella)

This umbrella was stolen from Col. A.D. Wintle” (note left in his permanently furled umbrella)

Time spent dismounted can never be regained.”

No true gentleman would ever leave home without one.” (his monocle)

Guy Fawkes was the last man to enter Parliament with good intentions. You need another like me to carry on his good work.”

I get down on my knees every night and thank God for making me an Englishman. It is the greatest honour He could bestow. After all, he might have made me a chimpanzee, or a flea, a Frenchman or a German!”

What I like about Isherwood’s paintings is that there is no doubt about which way they hang.” (on art)

Attend a German school sir? I would rather cut my hands off and blind myself in one eye. Only an English school is good enough for me.” (young Wintle, on being told by his father that he was to attend a German school)

Stop dying at once and when you get up, get your bloody hair cut.” (to Trooper Cedric Mays, Royal Dragoons, who recovered and lived to the age of 95)

Great War peace signed at last.” (diary, 19 June 1919)

I declare private war on Germany.” (diary, 20 June 1919)

Now, as I understand it, the US Army doesn’t permit its officers to carry umbrellas. How very unfortunate. 🙂

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