Standing Well Back

EOD responses

EOD Decision Making

After some recent dialogue with colleagues, but with some caution, I am returning to aspects of EOD Psychology. I have spoken at length to some leading medical doctors on how medical diagnostics are made prior and during complex surgery and I have continued to devour what I think might be relevant literature.

Let me explain my caution first.  When I trained as an EOD operator I received no instruction in dealing with cognitive biases, whether they be my own or others with whom I engaged with. When I commanded an EOD unit I had no real concept or understanding of cognitive biases displayed by my teams. But I think I  could tell a good operator from a bad one, and retrospectively I think it was those who were best able to make decisions under stress who stood out.  Without realising it I think I was identifying those who had techniques for coping with cognitive biases. Poor operators were ones whose cognitive biases overwhelmed them to a point of confusion.

In the (many!) years since I moved on from operational duties I have worked with a significant number of bomb squads and EOD operators around the world. I have also studied, on an amateur level, aspects of psychology that I felt were relevant. I have written some posts about this activity on this website before – you can find them by following the “EOD Psychology” tab on the sidebar to the right.

For what it is worth, I still consider myself very much an amateur in this field. But some of the lessons I have learned apply not only in the EOD world but in broader life, business, especially in complex projects.

One post that got some interesting personal feedback was the identification of techniques that EOD Operators could use to “force” them past cognitive biases. I proposed the use of a what I called a pre-mortem technique to force a more objective analytical approach in certain planned EOD operations. So, under some pressure to come up with more, here’s a second technique which may have some utility.  I’m thick skinned so if you think this is nonsense, let me know. I’m fairly certain that at its worst, it can do no harm…. here goes.

I think that lessons can be learned from most EOD operations, but that most EOD operators are intrinsically poor at learning those lessons, due to cognitive biases. EOD operators (and frankly this applies in many other fields) are humans who need to force themselves to better identify “decision quality” from “outcome quality” and clearly differentiate between the two.

So, to give this context, ask yourself this question – In your last period of operational activity which was the operation where you made the best decision?  Think hard on that now before reading on….

Now… I’m willing to bet that many of you are now thinking about an operation that went well, as a result. But here is your mistake – you are probably thinking about the “outcome” of your decision not the decision itself.  It is really tricky to identify decision quality subjectively. But I genuinely think it is a skill that one can learn and also dare I say comes with age (I’m making a case for grey beards here!).   So here is the technique I propose that will not interrupt operational activity but in after-action thinking might help you train your brain to think more about decision quality :

After every operation have a think and identify the best decision you made on that operation and the worst. Try to do that consistently. It works well for major business projects too, I think. You will probably find it tricky to start with, and only identify trivial decisions, but it will come as you “force” your brain to address its biases. After a while you will start to identify those decisions you make that have a “quality” that is perhaps unrelated to to the outcome quality. You will build a personal awareness about those decisions you find easy and those decisions you find tricky. Self awareness is the key. You might start to see pattern. I hope you will, and you can use your consequent understanding to make more better decisions and less poor decisions, notwithstanding the outcome of the operation. A “good enough” operation is not one where all your decisions will be satisfactory – use the opportunity!  I would even recommend including these questions in post operational reports with a specific box for each. I would recommend instructors on training courses ask these of their students after a training task. I think it will encourage self awareness, encourage a focus on decision making, and might even provide help to others in your unit.

Good luck. Tell me if it is nonsense.  I welcome dialogue either directly at the email address top right or through the on line comment section.

On a different point, I was talking to a well respected neuro-surgeon about decision making and he recommended two books on the subject – I was gratified that the two books he mentioned were ones I have found very helpful in thinking about this subject. So on the basis of his recommendation, not just mine, here they are:

1. Thinking Fast and Slow, By Daniel Kahneman

2. Sources of Power – How people make decisions, by Gary Klein

Non EOD interesting stuff

A peculiar Heavy Water journey

This week is the anniversary of Operation Gunnerside, a fantastic SOE operation to destroy the Norwegian Heavy Water plant at Vermork. The wider story of the destruction of Vermork is told here and is well worth a read.  I would also recommend reading this if you have a few minutes, an excellent contextual document with also some fascinating detail.

The anniversary reminded me that a few years ago I blogged about the Earl of Suffolk GC, the eccentric English aristocrat, adventurer and experimental bomb disposal expert who played a key role in “rescuing” a batch of heavy water from France as the Nazis invaded.  In retracing some of the research for that I found a nice little thread, looking at the journey that the Heavy Water took. It is a tale of secret operations, spies, buccaneering adventurers waving pistols, and peculiar persuasive pragmatism, worthy of a heist movie. So here it is:

  • In early 1940 a group of clever French Physicists (Joliot (husband and wife), von Halban and Kowarski) had recognised the potential of heavy water to perform as a moderator in a nuclear fission reaction. The only place in the world where this heavy water (deuterium oxide) was being produced in any quantity was in Norway by Norsk Hydro. Norsk Hydro was effectively controlled financially by the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas. At the outbreak of WW2 in 1939 almost the entire world stock of any significance was 185kg, held by the Norwegians.  They had already limited the Germans to buying only a few litres a year, and the French had intelligence that the Nazis were seeking much more. Vitally, the French were able to see the importance of heavy water as a weapon component. Interestingly the Norwegians were not aware of that and made an assessment that the German interest had a use in biological research.
  • With the political situation deteriorating and with excellent forethought the French authorities moved to secure this 185kg, using a combination of bank pressure and the pragmatic, persuasive skills of Lieutenant Jacques Allier of the Deuxieme Bureau. I think the reasons were twofold – to secure it for themselves and also to prevent acquisition by the Nazis.  Allier travelled to Norway under a false passport in his Mother’s maiden name, via Stockholm.  The French went to some trouble in preparation designing aluminium metal canisters that were specifically built that could be disguised in suitcases. These were made in Norway. They had to be made from metal without any trace of boron or cadmium and some other trace elements which might cause the heavy water useless.
  • There are some indications that the Nazis were aware of the presence of Allier in Norway and had alerted local agents, even providing them with the name that Allier was travelling under.
  • In a series of meetings Allier persuaded Norsk Hydro to part with their entire stock – 185kg – of heavy water. Nordsk Hydro provided the stuff at no cost despite Allier being authorised to pay a significant sum – Norsk Hydro were left in no doubt as to the military imperative of the material to France.  The material was poured into the 26 five litre special aluminium containers. In two batches then, the Heavy Water started their journey, on 9 March 1940, both ending up by seperate routes in Oslo, where they were stored in a French safe house which happened to be next door to a German Abwehr owned office.
  • The next day, 10 March 1940 a complex operation took place with Allier and a colleague booked with a cargo on a plane to Amsterdam, but conducted a secret “switch” actually boarding a plane to Scotland. Just as well because the Amsterdam plane was intercepted by the Luftwaffe and forced to land in Hamburg – clearly the German knew something was up.
  • As the plane carrying Allier and the first batch of Heavy Water left the coastline of Norway it too was tailed by another plane – but the adventurous Allier briefed his pilot that they were secret agents and persuaded him to “lose” its tail in the clouds. According to one report the plane climbed so high that Allier passed out due to lack of oxygen.  Eventually it landed near Montrose in Scotland.
  • There is a suggestion that the operation to fly out to Scotland was assisted by MI6 in Oslo. One report suggests that the MI6 agent, Frank Foley, helped load the plane at Oslo airport. Indeed when the plane landed (another followed the following day with the remaining heavy water), there were no customs or immigration procedures applied.
  • After a night in an Edinburgh hotel with the 26 canisters alongside the beds, the French agents, led by Allier, caught the train to London with the canisters stowed in the overhead luggage racks. As we will see this wasn’t their last journey on British train luggage racks…
  • From London Allier took the canisters to France by train and ferry and eventually storing them in a cellar in the College de France in Paris. He was given a receipt, on 16 March 1940.
  • Two months later on 16 May 1940, the Nazis invaded France, and the Heavy Water was loaded in a truck and taken 200 miles south to the vaults of a bank in Clermont Ferrand.
  • Soon after the cans were moved, oddly to a women’s prison in Monts Dore, and then to the Central Prison in Riom. It is sort of peculiar that prisons were used on this journey (and not for the last time).
  •  Now, Allier reappeared on the scene, with instructions to take th e heavy water to London, via Bordeaux, ahead of the German advance.on 17 June 1940, Allier arrived at Riom prison, but the prison governor was reluctant to release the cans. Allier drew his revolver and the governor was “persuaded”.  Some prisoners helped load the cans onto Allier’s waiting vehicle. The vehicle with Allier and some scientists aboard arrived at a requisitioned school in Bordeaux at midnight. There they received instructions to take the cargo and load it on a coal ship, the “Broompark” in Bordeaux docks. Arriving there in in the early hours of 18 June 1940 they were met on the gangplank by a strange character – Moustached, short sleeved, arms covered with tattoos, two revolvers in shoulder-holsters and swinging a riding crop. It was “Jack Howard”, the Earl of Suffolk and Berkshire. Acting as an unpaid “science attache” he was coordinating the Broompark’s journey, loaded with Heavy Water, diamonds, physicists and machine tools. Interestingly, the MI6 agent who had been in Oslo two months earlier, Frank Foley, was also at the docks. Later that same day, 18 June 1940 the Broompark steamed out of Bordeaux. The 26 cans had been lashed to a raft on the deck in the hope of saving them if the ship was sunk – clearly Howard knew the importance of the cans, and had probably been briefed by Frank Foley, who had left to head south over the Pyrenees to Spain.  I have picked up that Howard may have stashed a special part of his cargo ashore on the coast somewhere not far from Bordeaux, but it is pretty vague and its not clear at all. one report says that whatever it was was “collected” in a secret naval operation sometime later. Could be a spoof, maybe with the help of Foley.
  • On 21 June 1940 the Broompark docked in Falmouth England. It had been spotted by a German aircraft at one point in the Bay of Biscay but no action had been taken against it. So the heavy water was back in England, and once more was loaded onto a train, the express, to London Paddington, with Jack Howard guarding it, unshaven, fierce and with his twin shoulder-holstered pistols on clear display.
  • Arriving in Londonon 22 June 1940, the Heavy Water was again sentenced to imprisonment, this time in a cell Wormwood Scrubs a legendary London prison.
  • Some time later the Heavy Water was transferred, of all places, to Windsor Castle, home of the Royal Family, were, under the watchful eye of the King’s librarian, Owen Morshead, it was stored with the Crown jewels. I kid you not.
  • It is possible that in the next two years the Heavy Water was moved to Cambridge were British research into fission was ongoing, but I can find no specific records.
  • The Heavy Water is next recorded as being delivered to the Anglo-Canadian research effort in Montreal, Canada on 1 May 1943. I do not know its mode of transport across the Atlantic. In 1944 the Heavy Water was moved to the Chalk River Experimental Plant on the Ottawa River.
  • In 1946, the French government then requested “Could France have its Heavy Water back please?” This clearly caused something of a panic. A note dated 30 September 1946 noted that the “remaining” material was stored in container “T-7” which was 99.5% pure with respect to Deuterium. It was agreed to ship 100ml back to France which accordingly occurred, being flown by Trans-Canada airlines to Paris. So a small quantity returned “home” to the French.
  • In 1947 Drum T-7 containing the Heavy Water was sent to Trail in British Columbia for re-processing. At this point it appears to have been mixed with other Heavy Water, losing its “French” identity.
  • In 1948 the French, supported by the British, requested return of the material or equivalent from other sources. After some discussion 32.5 pounds of heavy water was shipped to France, via Harwell in the UK in a stainless steel drum.

This may be, at the end of the day, simply a logistics story, but I feel it is a true adventure, featuring bravery, human character and fortitude, and it is a story which may have changed the world.

For more on Jacques Allier, see here.  Frank Foley was another remarkable man, and a little of his life is detailed here.  He helped 10,000 Jews escape Nazi Germany, was responsible for interrogating Rudolf Hess, and played a key role in the Double Cross deception operation using double agents to persuade the Nazis that the Allies would invade the Pas de Calais rather than Normandy.  Some more on ” Charles Howard” is here.

20th Century

Was Lawrence of Arabia trolling the Royal Engineers?

Further to the series of posts on Railway IEDs I have found an article written by Lawrence of Arabia for the Royal Engineers’ Journal, Vol XXIX, No1, January 1919, shortly after the end of the war. The article was signed “T.E.L.” and describes how he and his colleagues blew up Ottoman railway lines in Arabia during the war.   Now, as I have written earlier, Lawrence was quite willing to take credit for others where he felt it necessary. He relied on the technical skills of one or two Royal Engineer officers and Major Garland (a former Ammunition specialist) for developing his sabotage techniques. You can see these articles here.     In this article there is a strange paragraph where Lawrence may be “pulling the leg” of his Royal Engineer colleagues, as he describes handling explosives in a fairly “adventurous” way.  I’ll leave you to judge by repeating a paragraph verbatim. I have bolded a couple of the most outrageous sentences:

The actual methods of demolition we used are perhaps more interesting than our manners of attack. Our explosives were mainly blasting gelatine and guncotton. Of the two we infinitely preferred the former when we could get it. It is rather more powerful in open charges in direct contact, far better for indirect work, has a value of 5 to 1 in super-tamped charges, is quicker to use, and more compact. We used to strip its paper covering, and handle it in sandbags of 50 lbs. weight. These sweated vigorously in the summer heats of Arabia, but did us no harm, beyond the usual headache, from which we never acquired immunity. The impact of a bullet may detonate a sack of it but we found in practice that when running you clasp it to your side, and if it is held on that furthest from the enemy, then the chances are that it will not be hit, except by the bullet that has already inflicted a mortal wound on the bearer. Guncotton is a good explosive, but inferior in the above respects to gelatine, and in addition, we used to receive it packed 16 slabs (of 15 oz. each) in a wooden box of such massive construction that it was nearly impossible to open peacefully. You can break these boxes with an entrenching tool, in about four minutes slashing, but the best thing is to dash the box, by one of its rope or wire beckets against a rock until it splits. The lid of the box is fastened by six screws, but even if there is time to undo all of these, the slabs will not come out, since they are unshakably wedged against the four sides. I have opened boxes by detonating a primer on one corner, but regard this way as unnecessarily noisy wasteful and dangerous for daily use. 

20th Century

More railway IED attacks from history

I have built an exceptional trove of IED attacks on railways, which I’ll blog further about in coming days and weeks. These include:

1. A fascinating and unsolved IED attack on a railway line near Watford, in 1880, using an unusual booby trap switch.

2. A further campaign against the Ottoman train system in Salonika in the early 1900s.  So the Ottoman train system was subject to IED attacks in Salonika (now Greece) in the 1900s, in Arabia in WW1 (Lawrence etc) and in the Dardanelles campaign, WW1 (from submarines).

3. Attacks on the railway system in the Arab revolt in Palestine, pre WW2.  Of interest the British forces in Palestine applied an unusual,and in today’s terms, immoral technique for preventing booby trapped rail IEDs -see the photo below, which shows an improvised armoured rail car behind two Arab hostages.

Also from Palestine, but this immediately post WW2, and prior to the establishment of Israel. the railway lines were attacked extensively by the Irgun/Stern gang.  These groups posed a significant IED problem for the British Forces, which I’ll write about in coming days – a largely forgotten story, with some challenging EOD situations and challenging IEDs.  This device below uses a bell push which is depressed by a bracket fastened to a sleeper.  I found this image in an official British Royal Engineer publication from 1946 describing Irgun devices.   Note that the device contained a hidden anti-handling switch in addition to the bell push. (Details of that not shown, for security reasons).

 

20th Century

Investigating Zeppelin Bombs – WW1 Tech Int

A while back I posted a long piece, here, about a number of German air dropped bombs including a peculiar incendiary dropped from Zeppelins.  Here’s a picture I just found of two officers inspecting the remains of such a device – Tech Int from WW1.  I think the “well-known naval airman” on the right might be Lt Rex Warnford, awarded the Victoria Cross for shooting down a Zeppelin.

 

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