Standing Well Back
19th Century

Update – Majendie and the “Crime of the Century” bomb

A few years ago I wrote a blog post about an IED that exploded prematurely at Bremerhaven docks on 11 December 1875. That post is at this link here – Crime of the Century.  Please re-read that report before reading on here.   At the time I had somewhat incomplete information but now I have found more material including a report, written soon after the incident by Col (then Major) Majendie that has come into my hands and adds some fascinating detail.  This is good Weapons Technical Intelligence from our esteemed Colonel Majendie. Majendie was the lead explosive expert in the Home Office and the father of modern British EOD and IED incident investigation. He had access to German police reports suggesting the following:

  1. The explosive used was a Nitro-glycerine based dynamite, called “Lithofracteur” – nitro-glycerine mixed into kieselguhr, sawdust, charcoal and bran . This, Thomas (aka, Keith, aka Garcie) had purchased in March 1875 .
  2. Keith had actually attempted to blow up cargo ships on one or two previous translatlantic crossings, but the initiation mechanism had failed. It seems likely that the Bremerhaven incident was the second or third attempt.
  3. The large crate that the device was hidden in was dropped but it probably wasn’t the impact of the drop on the sensitive dynamite to explode that caused the explosion.
  4. The complex timing and initiation contraption, designed by Keith but manufactured by German clock engineers , was not quite manufactured as per the instructions – because Keith’s “cover story” to the manufacturers provided a set of circumstances that didn’t quite make sense. Part of the contraption had levers which caused the action on the detonator at the right time.  These levers were held in place with springs.  The design included a spring detent to hold the levers in place but because Keith had told the  manufacturers that the levers were to cut silk threads while fitted to a bench in a factory, the manufacturers saw no need for this detent and left the spring out.
  5. Thus, the levers were able to move under external force on the whole mechanism. The force of the crate dropping on the stone dockside was not enough to cause the explosive to function – this form of dynamite is not that sensitive in most cases. But the assessment is that the force was enough to overcome the striker springs in the timed initiation mechanism even though it wasn’t  technically  “armed” at that point.
  6. So the premature explosion of the IED occurred because the perpetrator was so secretive about the use of the mechanism that the efficient German engineers manufacturing it thought it was a redundant part so omitted it without telling Keith.

Majendie also reports on the complex insurance negotiations that Keith engaged in with the insurers Baring Brothers and others regarding the insurance of the box, which was his ultimate purpose to defraud.  The report by Majendie then suggests a deeper engagement in the investigation. Separate from the German police reports furnished by the British consul in Bremherhaven, it appears that Majendie and his scientific adviser Dr Dupre obtained a diagram based on a drawing by the clockwork engineer Fuchs of the timing and initiation mechanism.   I think this was a copy of the diagram shown in this excellent report. This report even includes a picture of replica of the mechanism made by the original maker.  Fuchs, the clock engineer made a bit of hay after the explosion and made duplicates of his clockwork mechanism and sold them to a number of museums. There is a vagueness about the source of this diagram in Majendie’s report which I find suspicious and deliberate.   Furthermore it is clear that there was some form of very rapid international investigation which Majendie refers to obliquely. Although Majendie doesn’t mention it, I think this will have been an international investigation undertaken by the famous Pinkerton’s agency, probably at the behest of the insurance companies involved.  Majendie’s report also suggests to me that Dr Dupre, the scientist, was working perhaps secretly on a mission Germany to gather more intelligence on the operation. It certainly appears he met Fuchs, the clockmaker. A secret IED intelligence operation, no less. Certainly Majendie seems to have full details of negotiations the perpetrator had with insurers so I suspect he was provided with a copy of the Pinkerton report on their investigation.

It is suggested that Thomas/Keith may have had a role in other curious incidents and missing ships, perhaps in a series of insurance frauds.  This appears to have worried Majendie who undertook investigations of other cargoes that may have been sent by “Keith” including the investigation of the cargo on the ship “Salier” docked in Southampton.  Majendie also conducted quite a range of experiments on the sensitivity of lithofracteur – but also complains of the salacious reports in the press which exaggerate the threats from explosives- comments from public figures who should know better, exacerbating his challenges in an unwanted manner and misunderstanding, misrepresenting or having no bearing on the technical issues. Plus ca change as Dr Dupre would say.

Here’s a pic of the bodies being removed from the dockside in Bremerhaven after the explosion:

The lessons from this incident, still today, after over 150 years are:

a. International cooperation on IED investigation is not new, and pays dividends.
b. The implicit secrecy of planning and preparing IEDs leads to unexpected pressures. These pressures often cause the operation to fail, or provide the perpetrator with unwanted or unexpected changes to the operation. A careful WTI investigator will consider these pressures in his analysis.
c. The obvious cause of an explosion isn’t always the case. Only careful examination of the components, or in this case the component diagram revealed the full nature of why it occurred when it occurred.
d. Close partnership between lead investigators and scientific advisers is essential as is the ability to carry out experiments to test theories.
e. IED incident investigations were pretty good 150 years ago.

1940-1950

The Russian IED connection

Last year I wrote two important blog pieces. The first was about the Russian IED expert Ilya Starinov – certainly the most important person in the history of explosive sabotage.  The second post was about the Russian F-10 radio controlled demolition device, used successfully by Starinov in WW2.

Since than I have been digging to find more details of Starinov’s devices, which I have finally successfully done, and there are some very interesting findings.    I’ve also uncovered other anecdotal stuff about Starinov and indeed about the broader history of IEDs which I’ll post in coming days and weeks.  I also have more technical detail on the F-10 to discuss in future posts.

Now, firstly, a caution. Some of the material I have found regarding the construction and design of certain IEDs could be abused by people with ill-intent. All the material I am going to post is unclassified, but I’m going to obscure parts of it and discuss things in some vague terms  to make it much less useful to those with criminal intent.  If you want to know the source and you know me or can prove you have a legitimate need to see the sources I am using, then get in touch. Otherwise I make no apology for being deliberately non-specific about some of this material. Now, I found the source of this material on line, and others may be able too, but I am going to limit my helpfulness towards those who shouldn’t have this detail.  If you want to challenge my assessments and why I draw the conclusions I reach below, I’m very happy to do this off-line.  This means, perhaps, you are going to have to trust me on some of my assessments. Or not!  Finally I should also point out, sadly, that there is no shortage of detailed technical instructions for miscreants to find how to make bigger and better IEDs then these here discussed in an openly available 70-year-old document, discussing devices from the Eastern Front in 1942.  The horse of IED knowledge bolted a long time ago.  Close the stable door if you can – I can’t.

The document I found was developed not from Russian sources, but from US sources, who clearly in the immediate post-war period of 1945-1950 had access to German Wehrmacht engineers reports. These engineers had conducted thousands of successful EOD operations. By gleaning reports of Soviet demolition activity, dealt with by the German engineers in WW2, the US military tried to gain a greater understanding of Soviet capabilities in the 1950s. So this was real technical intelligence on Soviet explosive technology, and explosive sabotage tactics, as the Cold War span up.  So here we have, in 2020, the opportunity to examine 1950s US military technical intelligence, derived from Nazi German technical intelligence from the period 1940-1945, about Russian explosive devices.  So this isn’t exactly a primary source.  But some of the detail I’m going to show you makes me convinced this is worthwhile, valuable historical material, and there are certain aspects which surprised me.

Firstly to remind you of the context. It is apparent that the Soviet soldier of WW2 was pretty familiar with improvising explosives charges, either using his own munitions or captured German munitions. The Germans state that the Russian soldier is “particularly ingenious in installing improvised mines and booby traps“. During the latter part of WW2, the Russian use of sabotage explosive devices went way beyond anything seen before or since. Furthermore partisans in Eastern European countries were trained to improvise yet further. Thousands of railway lines, trains and vehicles were attacked explosively by Russians or Russian sponsored partisans in eastern Europe. Much of this was coordinated by Ilya Starinov, who also designed explosive devices , trained the perpetrators and on many occasions planted key devices himself. Starinov survived numerous purges, and went on to develop spetzntaz units and tactics, and taught revolutionaries around the world in the 1950s and 1960s.

In this first post, I’m going to highlight some very interesting similarities between Soviet sabotage devices from WW2 and (get this) IRA devices of the 1970’s, 1980’s and even 1990’s.  These similarities go beyond just application of general explosive/sabitage principles – there are significant design similarities in aspects of the devices.  Here’s some examples, and a final, highly technical device that I won’t comment on too deeply.

  1. Firstly there is the use of specific component items.  In the 1970s and into the 1990s, many PIRA devices encountered in the UK had firing or arming switches as part of the circuitry. In the vast majority of cases, in what was termed “Time and Power Units” (TPUs) this switch consisted of an adapted wooden springed clothes peg help open with a wooden dowel. Here’s a demonstration circuit showing the “IRA technique”.
  2. The clothes peg was wired so that a switch closed when an insulator was removed from the jaws of the peg, arming this device. In the 1950 document I have found. German engineers describe this exact concept being found in Russian devices in the early 1940s. Here’s a pic:  

3. In the late 1980s, PIRA developed the “Mk 12” mortar as British Forces called it. This was followed in 1993 by the smaller “Mk16” Mortar. These were missiles that had a shaped charge in its front end, a hollow pipe behind it containing a fuze and tail fins to stabilise in flight.  This wasn’t really a mortar but a horizontally fired missile typically fired at vehicles. It had a shaped charge warhead and a fuze set in the hollow tube behind, with simple fns to stabilise  it in its short flight.  Here’s  a picture of a PIRA Mk 12 Mortar. disassembled:

4. In WW2 Russian partisans developed a device that is remarkably similar. Not tube-launched but built for a similar purpose and with almost identical design principles. Here’s the pic from the 1950 report:

5.  The Russians also concentrated significantly on additional circuits or mechanisms to booby trap charges. By introducing anti-handling and anti-lift charges, several of the devices used by the Soviets appear remarkably similar to what the British EOD community of the 1970’s refer to as “Castlerobin” devices. I’m not going to discuss this further here. But clearly there is a thought-process going on to prevent the render safe of devices, and target the EOD operator. The parallels in design are clear.

6. The creation of devices which target EOD activities went a step further with the introduction of a RF sensitive switch designed to initiate an explosive device when certain mine detection equipment was used. This was fielded in December 1943.  Some of this equipment was captured by the Wehrmacht in January 1944, and rapidly exploited.  70 years later , technology which is triggered by the RF signature of certain EOD equipments would be regarded as a very high threat indeed – yet, here the Russians were in the early 1940s developing such technology. The device responded to a frequency of 800-2000Hz at short range, emitted by German EOD equipment. What is more, the Germans recognised the importance of such an advance, examined the Russian technology, identified some flaws, and developed their own version of the equipment. They also developed technical solutions to the threat.   I find that remarkable, and some of you will share my surprise for reasons we won’t go into. Here’s an excerpt from the report showing the circuit to prove it is what I say it is – (I have obscured part of it for reasons explained earlier).

To be clear in my assessments: I’m not saying that the IRA devices of the late twentieth century were designed by the Russians – just that there are some odd parallels, that may be coincidences. Direct influence is possible but so, theoretically, is the potential for the IRA to have got hold of the American report written in the 1950s. It’s not secret.  But we shouldn’t underestimate the fact that Starinov was training revolutionaries from around the world. I do think that these parallels once again highlight the importance of understanding the history of IEDs.  The fact that Russian devices were so focused on countering EOD action is interesting and significant and deserves wider understanding.  The general under-appreciation of the extensive, WW2 Russian sabotage campaigns using improvised explosive devices is barely recognised and deserves a much greater level of attention. Frankly it makes the efforts of the British SOE or American OSS look very paltry in comparison.

In future blogs related to all this I will address the following:

  1. Some Russian devices designed specifically for targeting railways – further to my series in the subject. Some were designed by Starinov himself.
  2. More technical details of the Russian F-10 radio controlled device.
  3. Some more details and photographs of Ilya Starinov, and an interesting story about the F-10 radio-controlled devices he deployed to assassinate German General General Braun in Kharkov in November 1941, and the role of a young commissar called Krushchev (yes, that one) in the operation, protecting Starinov from being arrested by Beria’s agents and “purged” before the device was detonated.
  4. An odd and fascinating series of parallels between this 1950s American report and another American report written in 1865 showing almost identical devices. History repeating itself again. Some of the Russian devices of WW2 are identical to Russian devices of the 1850s, and some other Russian devices of WW2 are very similar to American revolutionary devices of 1778.

All in all, this document is a bit of a treasure trove when put within the larger context of the history of IEDs over several centuries.

 

Weapons Technical Intelligence

Mystery Object Challenge

So this image is the subject of my next blog post (probably). A small quiz, the prize for which I haven’t decided yet…but it will be good! First person to get two out of the following three questions right

1. What terrorist group is responsible for this device?

2. What year was it made and deployed? (I’ll give you + or – 5 years)

3. What is the component in the bottom right of the image? (Clue, it’s from a motor  vehicle, and it’s not a battery)

Answer by commenting below.  Good luck!

Clearly I’m making this too difficult… so here’s some clues.

1. The device was used in Belfast.

2. The mystery component is from a Ford Model T… which should help with the date and the nature of the component (which is very interesting)

3. An Army Organisation made it safe, but which one?

1850-1860

Senior officers and explosive investigation don’t mix

In the last few days the British Royal Navy  have announced a “large” deployment (their words not mine!) to the Baltic as part of a NATO exercise.     The reports mention that this is the largest deployment to the Baltic for 100 years.

Actually the previous deployments are pretty interesting.  If you don’t know the story of Agar VC, who tore around the Baltic in a fast torpedo boat, delivering and picking up spies for MI6, then sinking Russian cruisers, in 1919 (!)  you should read this life story here.  Jaw dropping stuff.  I have mentioned one of his WW2 exploits here, and he also took part in the Zeebrugge Raid in 1918, so he is a recurring character on this blog.  Nothing to do with explosives but the story of the sinking of HMS Dorsetshire is remarkable.

There also was a significant range of British naval operations in the Baltic during the Crimean war (1855).   I’ve mentioned this in passing in earlier posts but it’s worth revisiting.  The Russians had a major naval base on the island of Kronstadt hat was potentially a target for attack by the British Navy. The Russians deployed a fairly large number of explosive devices, tethered just below the surface of the sea on the approaches to the base, in effect an early sea mine. (Similar devices had been deployed in the Crimea and you can see a superb drawing of one here)

The British Navy on patrol in the Baltic became aware of them, and decided to investigate, sending two ships, with senior officers aboard to recover and examine the devices.

Here’s a Royal Navy diagram:

The device works when the rod A-A is struck by the side of a vessel. This rod then pushes on a glass vial of Sulphuric Acid (D-D), breaking it at the bottom. The acid drops into a container full of Potassium Chlorate (C), causing a reaction which ignites the gunpowder charge. This fuze is called a “Jacobi fuze” although in fact it was designed by Immanuel Nobel, father of Alfred Nobel.

Provided the rods aren’t pushed, (they are held by a spring), it is possible in theory to recover the mine, which is exactly what sailors from a ship carrying Admiral Seymour did. On recovering the device onto the deck of the ship it was carefully taken apart, and there was discussion amongst the officers observing how the mechanism should work.  Admiral Seymour, being a “hands-on sort of chap” worked it out an exclaimed “O no. This is the way it would go off” – and he pushed the bar A-A. The device duly functioned as intended , exploded, and knocked everyone down around it. Seymour survived but was badly injured.

 

The very next day, a ship carrying Admiral Dundas recovered a similar device. Admiral Dundas performed exactly the same trick as Admiral Seymour, the device exploded and Dundas nearly lost his sight.

Senior officers eh?

 

 

Uncategorised

Stealthy Explosive Attacks at Sea – 1805

Given recent explosive attacks in the Gulf, it’s worth remembering that stealthy attacks on maritime vessels with explosive devices isn’t exactly new.  In 1804 and 1805 Robert Fulton designed some IEDs for the British Navy. Fulton was something of a peripatetic bomb maker and inventor – making devices for the French, for the British and then for his home nation the USA. In 1805, his devices were used in a small number of British attacks against the French in the Channel ports.  Most of these attacks were failures or had limited effect.  However the French authorities recovered the devices, and examined them in detail.  So this is a lovely early example of Technical Intelligence and Weapons Technical intelligence regarding IEDs.  The French artist was fantastic and his diagrams of the devices have survived. Frankly they put many modern IED intelligence reports to shame. Here are the diagrams with some annotations (in red) by me.

The first diagram is a clockwork timer initiation device, used to detonate a floating explosive charge. The clockwork timer is connected to an adapted firearm lock, a flintlock in this case. You should recognise the flintlock mechanism in the device below:

This clockwork initiation mechanism was attached to a main explosive charge. The main charge was a large sealed canoe shaped pontoon, described as a coffer. Two of these were attached to make a barely buoyant twin raft with a rowing position in the middle.

Here’s the charge:

The coffer was filled with gunpowder and also, in effect, sub-munitions, described as “combustible balls” and other, larger “hogshead” explosive charges were , I think towed behind, but the initiation mechanism for these hogsheads I can’t quite make head or tail of.

Finally here

Finally, here’s a diagram of the “catamaran”. It was rowed into place not far from the French Imperial Fleet. The rowers then pulled a lever to start the timer, slipped into the water and swam to accompanying boats. The tide then took the just-floating catamarans (I think there were at least two) towards the anchored fleet, with the barrels designed to foul the ships and swing the larger charges alongside the ship. As you can see they were pretty large contrivances.

So… Here we have, 214 years ago, a stealthy IED attack on French Navy vessels, by the British, designed by an American, and with a superb Technical Intelligence report on the failed devices by the French. This stuff ain’t new.  I hope to have more (new) detail on Fulton’s explosive device design in coming months.

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