Not only do EOD technicians have to be highly skilled… They have to be highly patient too when being interviewed by poorly prepared and fairly stupid interviewers. Capt Wayne Owers (with a tally of 90+ IEDs rendered safe) is interviewed here, and shows remarkable patience with the radio host Jeremy Vine. Foolish questions! But Wayne comes across very well. His blunt assessment of “The Hurt Locker” (don’t go there) is professional, but after the interview Vine goes back to it repeatedly. Duh. Vine also reads out some comment that Owers should be awarded “the British Medal” whatever that is. Good grief. My brain aches listening to Vine’s crap.

Good on Owers though, putting up with buffoonery.

The interview will be available on iPlayer if you want to listen to it for seven days (until April 14). It starts around 1:19 into the show.

Bruce Schneier writes about security, and is a “security technologist”. He writes here for CNN about aviation security post the pants bomber. Well, with respect to Mr Schneier, I’m a security technologist too, I suppose, and I think he’s just wrong. I was tempted to say “plane” wrong, but too many of those jokes get irritating quickly.

Mr Schneier suggests that the plot was half baked using “home brew” explosives. While true that the device failed to function as intended, its clear to me that the device could have worked. AbdulMutallab’s predecessor, who attempted to kill a Saudi Prince in August got his device through airport security and into the presence of his target and it functioned. Had either device been on an aircraft at altitude I think it could have brought it down. Playing down threats suggesting they are less of a threat because of home brew explosives doesn’t hold water – about 90% of all IEDs in Afghanistan are currently “home brew” explosives and they are doing the job they are intended to do. One lucky failure doesn’t take away the threat.

Mr Schneier makes some valid points about risk assessment and the the human  predisposition that makes danger difficult for us to assess. That’s fine but suggesting that consequently we shouldn’t bother scanning passengers simply doesn’t follow. Should we do away with the metal detectors and baggaae screening too? Of course not.

His parting remark that we as a society should be focusing on the “general risk of troubled teenagers” is a little farcical for a security technologist, is it not?

Bottom line One: The device such as found in the pants bomber poses a threat that is very real to the passengers on that plane with him. It also poses a threat to the aviation business generally. It perhaps doesn’t pose, in the big scheme of things, much of a threat statistically speaking to the hundreds of thousands of air passengers who fly on any given day. But the threat to the economy of the world if, lets say six or seven, airliners fall out of the sky is very real and worth spending some money on and applying some security technology to.

Bottom Line Two: The device can be detected by millimetric wave technology, and there is also technology that can do this without the privacy issues that seems to concern many. Integrate this with the already in-place metal detection arches and you have a quick easy, not too expensive solution.

I think it is time this subject was approached with some common sense. A lot of commentators are suggesting this sort of security technology is a step too far and intrudes on our rights and dignity. Its not, its only a step too far when such a big deal is made of it. As an individual, I prefer it that the people I fly with have been through effective security checks. Period. I’m very happy if the ninnies (and terrorists) who don’t like this don’t fly with me. More space on the plane for me.  Its true there are more ninnies than terrorists, but that’s fine with me too.

Interesting video here, taken from an Israeli UAV launched shortly after the explosion.  It seems to show Hezbollah loading what appears to be an object at least 3 m long onto a flatbed pickup, taken from the scene of the explosion.  My best guess, given the size of the object, woudl be a Fajr3 or possibly a Fajr5 missile.

But the interesting thing is perhaps not what the missile is, but what was going on at the site.  Fajr missiles are effectively “off the shelf”, point in the right direction and away its goes…. so what’s going on here, in association with the missiles, that causes an accidental explosion?  Modification of the missile or its warhead?  Why, with what?  Or something else?

Then usual range of conflicting stories from Hez, Lebanese Armyand all the variants thereof obscure the matter… What’s fairly certain is that something is going on, and its probably connected with Hez reworking missiles or something connected witrh such activity.  I hold little hope for UNIFIL getting to the bottom of it.

Here’s some scary new terrorism…of sorts.   Gangs roaming the North western Chinese city of Urumqui have stabbed, allegedly, hundreds of ethnic Han Chinese with hypodermic needles.  Over 476 people have sought treatment. The attacks seem to be racially motivated, therefore I assume the gangs are ethnic Uighurs, continuing some sort of separatist activity. Xinjiang has a high rate of AIDS cases, although there is no specific suggestion as yet that the stabbings are an attempt to infect or inject material of some sort.  Fuller report here.   Tension is rising between the Han and the Uighur groups, with the Han venting their anger against the government in protest marches.

Amidst rising worries again about Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal a strange thing happened last month. On 14 July a series of explosions occurred in the village of Khirbat Slim, about 10 miles north of the Israel/Lebanon border, in the area under UN control. Most analysts agree that the most likely cause was that an illegal store of Hezbollah munitions started to detonate. The UNIFIL forces went to investigate as this would have been a violation of UN Resolution 1701 but were driven off by locals throwing stones (aka Hezbollah, I would think). UNIFIL are not renowned for being able to be particularly forceful with either (or any) side in the region. To be fair, Hezbollah allege that the munitions were left there by the Israelis in 2006, but frankly that’s not very credible. Actually to be absolutely fair, the Lebanese government Foreign Ministry allege that the munitions were left there by the Israelis… but the Lebanese Foreign Minister is from Hezbollah, so make of that what you will. One interesting source suggests that some sort of munitions were actually being manufactured there… which makes me think it could have been an IED manufacturing facility.

What intrigues me is what was the cause of the explosion? Poor storage? Possibly. Hezbollah munitions or Israeli munitions collected by Hezbollah or an Israeli dump from 2006? Do you think the IDF knew about the store? You would think so, given their ISR efforts, but they did misread a lot of well camouflaged Hezbollah defensive positions and rocket launch sites in 2006. Would the IDF or one of its actors be able to initiate an accidental explosion? Who benefits? Do you think there are other munition stores in the UNIFIL controlled area? Will UNIFIL do anything about it? Are UNIFIL actually geared up to search for munitions hidden in that territory? (I doubt it) Do you think politics in Iran is getting messy and someone might want attention focused elsewhere in coming months? If it all kicks off could the Israelis rein themselves in from taking on Iran if they have 10,000 Iranian missiles being sent to them via Hezbollah? Or are Hezbollah deterring Israel from pre-emptively hitting Iran?

All is never quite as it seems in that neck of the woods. I have struggled to find a link to a news story that takes a rational view of all the conflicting claims, propaganda and bull**** – here’s the best I could find.