Standing Well Back
20th Century

1931 Train Bomber – Pervert or Russian Agent?

I’m grateful to Prof Tim Wilson for drawing my attention to these peculiar 1931 railway bombings by Sylvestre Matushka. Here’s the story:

In the 1930’s the most important “infrastructure” in Europe was the railway system. As my previous posts about railways have discussed, (see the tab on railway bombings in the right-hand column) railways provide a useful target for explosive attacks – they impact the wider world economically and therefore always get attention, there’s thousands of unguarded miles of tracks and bridges that provide safe and unconstrained opportunity of access, the presence of a population dense, massive target, arriving at great speed can be predicted, and the very fact a train balances fairly precariously on rails is also a key factor. So trains and railways were (and remain) a popular target.

The protagonist in this story, Sylvestre Matushka, was a Hungarian engineer and businessman. Some reports suggest that during the First World War he was a soldier in an Austro-Hungarian military engineer unit, responsible for demolitions of railway lines which of course, if true, would be significant. He later became a manager and owner of a number of businesses including a quarrying company which gave him access to explosives or a justification to purchase explosives. Other reports suggest he was a chemist.

Matrushka, (in a dirty raincoat!)

He made at least two unsuccessful efforts to derail trains with explosives in Austria in December and January 1930/31.  In the first attempt he loosened the railway track (also leaving a note saying ” “Assault! Revolution! Victory!”), but the attempted derailment failed. In the second, he fastened another rail across the track but that too failed to derail the train. Strange for him to use this methods if he was a chemist able to access explosives and had experience of damaging railway lines.

Then on 8 August 1931, he derailed a train with explosives causing over 100 casualties (none of them fatal) . The train was the Berlin-Basel express, and the attack took place just south of Berlin. I’m not sure of the device construction but one vague report suggests it was electrically initiated.

A little over a month later on September 13th, he successfully attacked the Budapest to Vienna express, a the Biatorbágy bridge near Budapest.  His device was placed on the viaduct and the train and several carriages plunged into a ravine.   Here 22 people died and 120 were injured. Matushka was arrested at the scene where he was pretending to be a surviving passenger. He was released but re-arrested a month later in Vienna, where he “confessed”. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.

I have regrettably found little detail so far about the device here also. It reportedly used dynamite in one source but another more convincing source suggests the explosive was “ecrasite”. Dynamite as a main charge would match the quarrying background of Matruska but ecrasite would perhaps marry with the report he was a chemist, and as military explosive perhaps marry with the reports that he had been a demolitions officer in the First Wold War.  One source, without explanation, suggests the Vienna device was initiated by the pressure of the train closing a switch. That’s interesting but I can’t confirm it yet. Such devices were certainly technologically possible, and were used in the Great War and before, as I have discussed in earlier posts, so would have been available in concept to Matushka. But he was “present at the scene” and a command initiated device would have been simpler perhaps, so I think there still remains a question mark over the initiation.

The question of Matushka’s “motivation” is interesting. Initially the investigations assumed a political motivation because at the Berlin explosion a defaced Nazi magazine was found and the note found after one of the earlier attempted derailments.  Allegedly a letter was found after the last incident “praising revolution” but there are suggestions that this was a plant that enabled the government to implement an anti-communist security crack-down. Two communists were executed for supposedly encouraging Matrushka, but there were doubts about how genuine this was.   At his trial he claimed he first claimed to have been directed by “God” to conduct the bombings, then that they were instigated by an imaginary or long dead friend, “Leo the Ghost” who only he could see and who had hypnotised him. The assessment at the time was that Matrushka was pretending to be insane.  Then a story emerged that he had sexual gratification from seeing dramatic and tragically violent incidents. This was supposedly the first ever case of “Symphorophilia”, and to be honest I’m not aware of any subsequent ones involving explosives, so I’m a bit sceptical. To me, it’s no more believable than “Leo the Ghost”.    In any event he was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. Matushka remained in jail in Vac throughout most of the Second World War. Vac was liberated by the advancing Soviet Army, and at that point Matushka disappeared.   There are unconfirmed but intriguing suggestions that he then worked for the Soviet Union under a new identity, as an explosives expert in the latter part of the War,  and perhaps even operated as a demolition expert in the Korean War in the 1950s. The Soviet Union certainly had secret programs to cause disruption to Western European countries later in the 1930s (see my earlier posts on Ilya Starinov) , and some of these did include train bombings of a similar kind. There are other rumours (supposedly back by documents) that he reappeared in Hungary in the 1970s under another identity.

There is an interesting possible link to the first bombing near Berlin. The morning after the bombing, two policemen were assassinated by a communist group who were active at the time – and Berlin was a long way from Matushka’s home turf.

So the possibilities are that

  • He was inspired by God
  • He was inspired for reasons of perverted sexual gratification
  • He was a right wing “plant” to justify anti-communist programs
  • He was a communist operative.

Take your pick.

 

16th Century

Development of Mechanical Explosive Initiators in the early 16th Century

A few days of enforced idleness has given me a little space to think. Inspired by my (off topic) recent post, a book review on the evolution of piston engines in the Second World War I’ve been thinking again about key technological developments in history with regard to explosives and related issues.

To put this blog into context, let me try to make things really simple.  An explosion, (whether that be of high explosives or gunpowder) is a chemical reaction, typically a change from a solid to a lot of gas. For about 500 years from about 1000 AD to 1500AD, there was only gunpowder, a low explosive, and this mix of chemical solids could be brought to change to gaseous products with the application of a naked flame which starts essentially a combustion process.  So by introducing a naked flame, or equivalent amount of heat, it starts the reaction, and causes the explosion of hot gases. Until about 1500 the only way of igniting gunpowder was by heat or flame. You can see my earlier post about other related technologies here.

But having to have an already burning flame or equivalent is tricky. You can’t disguise it easily. If your “match” is unlit you have too start a fire somehow and that takes time, even more so before the age of boxes of matches and cigarette lighters.  All this led to practical challenges in the use of firearms and explosives.  The most efficient method until 1500 (and indeed for many years later) was to have ready a slow match burning well in advance,

The time was ripe then in 1500 for a more flexible way of initiating gunpowder, either in a firearm or for an explosive device or indeed nay kind of munition that used gunpowder.  There then appears to have been a key turning point enabled by a number of disparate technologies. These include:

  • Engineering skill in terms of precision craftsmanship from clock makers. This included the development of skill which creation of relatively fine metal components that could be shaped into a fair amount of detail.
  • Advances in metallurgy and associated engineering that led to effective steel springs.  The springs become a “store” of energy which can be released to cause sparks with a little ingenuity. To be effective, springs needs to be relatively high in carbon so they don’t lose their “springiness”.   In the century running up to 1500, the manufacture of springs became optimised.
  • To me  (as an amateur blacksmith) there appears to be some clear links and cross over between “door lock” mechanisms that use springs to release levers, and these gun lock systems. As I understand it these engineering developments were also occurring at about this time in history.  And of course the word “lock” crosses the gap – in German where these may have been invented the word used for both firearm locks and gun locks is “Schloss”.

Around 1500 the wheel lock was developed, perhaps in Germany or perhaps by Leonardo Da Vinci.  The mechanism of the wheel lock is that potential energy is stored in a spring.  When the spring (carbon steel enabled by metallurgy) is released, this spring (a coil)  typically causes a steel wheel to turn around a spindle as in clock technology. The wheel , with a jagged edge turns against a quantity of pyrites, causing sparks to occur. The sparks drop into a container of ignitable material, typically gunpowder in our case.  In preparation to ignition a key is used to tension the spring, which is held on a latch.  That spring can be held indefinitely, with only the release of a latch needed to initiate the mechanism and whatever combustible is placed next to it. When the latch is released by a trigger, the wheel spins and another spring loaded lever pushes the pyrites into contact with it. Interestingly the “wheel” also needs to ideally be carbon steel to get the best sparks, so the development of these two key components were driven by clock makers developing springs for their mechanisms using carbon steel, and understanding how energy could be released from a spring and applied usefully. After all, engineering is often about how energy is turned from one form to another.

I’ve written before about a lovely diagram from the 1580s of an IED initiated by a wheel lock , with a fantastic picture I found in a book in the British Library. That post is here, but I’ll repeat this diagram below for convenience – it’s one of my favourite historical IEDs. One doesn’t need to understand the writing to work out what’s going on – note the string attached to the trigger, the wheelock mechanism and the fuze leading to a barrel of gunpowder.

So this image was a wheel lock initiated IED from 1582, and I wanted to find an earlier example.  Some sources suggest that Leonardo Da Vinci was the “inventor”, so I’ve been hunting for Da Vinci diagrams.  Here, below, is one from the “Madrid Codex” . Whether Da Vinci actually designed this or was simply copying a design made by a German inventor is an issue for the academics. If I’m honest I can’t quite understand the diagram (and also the accompanying text!)  but I have picked out some key points.  Let me at least point these out to you:

  1. The Trigger, is at the lower right hand side.  Compare this with the trigger above at the top, tied to a piece of string which runs round a pulley.
  2. There are two Serpentines in the diagram below. A serpentine is best thought of as a lever which acts under the effect of a spring. If I’m honest I’m not certain of the purpose of the left hand one – it could be as a release-latch on the spring loaded steel spinning wheel.  The right hand serpentine I think holds the pyrites, and a spring action pushes that down when triggered. “Serpentines” were of course used before wheel locks to hold the burning fuze of a match lock, then press it into the gunpowder when a trigger was pulled releasing it. the second serpentine could though, be a failsafe, duplicate to the first.
  3. The spinning wheel is shown vertical and isolated but I suspect it was horizontal, but it’s not clear to me how this was held. I’m also not sure what the circular object in the middle is.

 

In doing some more digging I found a couple more interesting diagrams that are worth showing in the context that I think they may not be to ignite explosives, but rather to light tinder, which in effect meets the same requirement.  Perhaps these “mechanical tinder igniters” were precursors to the wheel lock. They date from the first decade of the 1500s, right in the early days of match locks and I have lifted them from the “Loffelholz Kodex”. Here’s the first:

This is really a beautiful diagram, from 1505, and I think shows a pocket-sized igniter. A portable “everyday carry” from 500 years ago.  The box container contains tinder” or , if you like, gunpowder. The brass slide holds the tinder in a box. A cord is fitted to a spindle, and wound round and round. Also attached to the spindle is a steel wheel, and the serpentine holds the pyrites. The user, with a ring on his finger to which is tied the cord, pulls, the wheel spins, the pyrites is engaged , sparks fly and light the tinder. Replace the tinder with gunpowder, and run the cord as a trip wire and you have a booby trap IED.  You can see that with the addition of a clock spring ,  a release catch to allow the spring to act on the wheel and another spring to engage the pyrites, it is the same idea.

The second diagram is more complicated, and I confess I can’t quite work it out. But it is clearly a wheel lock device for some purpose or other. If you can interpret the action here, please let me know your thoughts. I can see the “wheel”, the tinder box, the serpentine holding the pyrites and one , if not two triggers, but I can’t quite work out the springs.  Clearly this is meant to be screwed onto the side of something.

What these inventions do, that previously wasn’t very easy to achieve, are:

  1. Reliable ignition of gunpowder without the need for a pre-lit burning fuze, allowing concealment in advance. This is a key IED capability. Previously any emplaced device would have been spotted by the smoke emitting from a match, and could not have been left for any length of time.
  2. Booby trap initiation – using the “string” to release a spring, or pull a spindle, both causing sparks and thence initiation of a charge.
  3. Command initiation from a distance, again using the string.
  4. Timed initiation – because a clock could be used to to cause the trigger to be pulled – and it was clock engineers who were developing the mechanisms anyway.

So these are startling new offensive capabilities for explosive devices. As such, the development of the wheel lock had perhaps more of an impact on explosive device design than on firearms. where , in battle at least, the need to conceal a burning match was not an issue.  Perhaps there was an impact though on the use of firearms in ambushes and for highway robbers, when firearms could be concealed under a cloak. Such mechanisms in firearms were quickly banned in some countries – again showing the potential for the illicit use of a mechanism such as this for nefarious effect.

As such I think that historically speaking the development of the wheel lock is one of the most significant engineering developments in the history of explosives as it provided several distance new IED capabilities.     Wheel locks were expensive to produce so the use of match locks continued for some time – flintlocks which came some time later were simpler and therefore cheaper to produce, eventually phasing out the wheel lock.  That development is in itself interesting because it was a “simpler” technology replacing a complex engineered device.

Before I finish, there’s two interesting aside. Most wheel locks used a concentric spiral spring to turn a spindle that ran through its middle. But there’s two other initiating systems , one a variant of the spring construction. This is it below, another Da Vinci Drawng, this from the Codex Alantic and you can see that the spring is a longitudinal coil rather than a spiral, but it still acts on a “wheel” that is perpendicular to the length of the spring.

Finally another approach to the same problems this not using a wheel at all but a longitudinal bar of steel pulled so that it scrapes along the pyrites. This is the Monk’s Gun, held in the Dresden Armoury. This dates from somewhere between 1480 and 1550.

Although it has no “wheel” it has the advantage (?) of being somewhat simpler. You can see the “serpentine” holing the pyrites, and the ring on the bottom is pulled to the right, causing the teeth on a steel slide to act on the pyrites producing a spark – hidden behind would have been a touch hole leading to the chamber of this simple gun.

 

19th Century

Update – Majendie and the “Crime of the Century” bomb

A few years ago I wrote a blog post about an IED that exploded prematurely at Bremerhaven docks on 11 December 1875. That post is at this link here – Crime of the Century.  Please re-read that report before reading on here.   At the time I had somewhat incomplete information but now I have found more material including a report, written soon after the incident by Col (then Major) Majendie that has come into my hands and adds some fascinating detail.  This is good Weapons Technical Intelligence from our esteemed Colonel Majendie. Majendie was the lead explosive expert in the Home Office and the father of modern British EOD and IED incident investigation. He had access to German police reports suggesting the following:

  1. The explosive used was a Nitro-glycerine based dynamite, called “Lithofracteur” – nitro-glycerine mixed into kieselguhr, sawdust, charcoal and bran . This, Thomas (aka, Keith, aka Garcie) had purchased in March 1875 .
  2. Keith had actually attempted to blow up cargo ships on one or two previous translatlantic crossings, but the initiation mechanism had failed. It seems likely that the Bremerhaven incident was the second or third attempt.
  3. The large crate that the device was hidden in was dropped but it probably wasn’t the impact of the drop on the sensitive dynamite to explode that caused the explosion.
  4. The complex timing and initiation contraption, designed by Keith but manufactured by German clock engineers , was not quite manufactured as per the instructions – because Keith’s “cover story” to the manufacturers provided a set of circumstances that didn’t quite make sense. Part of the contraption had levers which caused the action on the detonator at the right time.  These levers were held in place with springs.  The design included a spring detent to hold the levers in place but because Keith had told the  manufacturers that the levers were to cut silk threads while fitted to a bench in a factory, the manufacturers saw no need for this detent and left the spring out.
  5. Thus, the levers were able to move under external force on the whole mechanism. The force of the crate dropping on the stone dockside was not enough to cause the explosive to function – this form of dynamite is not that sensitive in most cases. But the assessment is that the force was enough to overcome the striker springs in the timed initiation mechanism even though it wasn’t  technically  “armed” at that point.
  6. So the premature explosion of the IED occurred because the perpetrator was so secretive about the use of the mechanism that the efficient German engineers manufacturing it thought it was a redundant part so omitted it without telling Keith.

Majendie also reports on the complex insurance negotiations that Keith engaged in with the insurers Baring Brothers and others regarding the insurance of the box, which was his ultimate purpose to defraud.  The report by Majendie then suggests a deeper engagement in the investigation. Separate from the German police reports furnished by the British consul in Bremherhaven, it appears that Majendie and his scientific adviser Dr Dupre obtained a diagram based on a drawing by the clockwork engineer Fuchs of the timing and initiation mechanism.   I think this was a copy of the diagram shown in this excellent report. This report even includes a picture of replica of the mechanism made by the original maker.  Fuchs, the clock engineer made a bit of hay after the explosion and made duplicates of his clockwork mechanism and sold them to a number of museums. There is a vagueness about the source of this diagram in Majendie’s report which I find suspicious and deliberate.   Furthermore it is clear that there was some form of very rapid international investigation which Majendie refers to obliquely. Although Majendie doesn’t mention it, I think this will have been an international investigation undertaken by the famous Pinkerton’s agency, probably at the behest of the insurance companies involved.  Majendie’s report also suggests to me that Dr Dupre, the scientist, was working perhaps secretly on a mission Germany to gather more intelligence on the operation. It certainly appears he met Fuchs, the clockmaker. A secret IED intelligence operation, no less. Certainly Majendie seems to have full details of negotiations the perpetrator had with insurers so I suspect he was provided with a copy of the Pinkerton report on their investigation.

It is suggested that Thomas/Keith may have had a role in other curious incidents and missing ships, perhaps in a series of insurance frauds.  This appears to have worried Majendie who undertook investigations of other cargoes that may have been sent by “Keith” including the investigation of the cargo on the ship “Salier” docked in Southampton.  Majendie also conducted quite a range of experiments on the sensitivity of lithofracteur – but also complains of the salacious reports in the press which exaggerate the threats from explosives- comments from public figures who should know better, exacerbating his challenges in an unwanted manner and misunderstanding, misrepresenting or having no bearing on the technical issues. Plus ca change as Dr Dupre would say.

Here’s a pic of the bodies being removed from the dockside in Bremerhaven after the explosion:

The lessons from this incident, still today, after over 150 years are:

a. International cooperation on IED investigation is not new, and pays dividends.
b. The implicit secrecy of planning and preparing IEDs leads to unexpected pressures. These pressures often cause the operation to fail, or provide the perpetrator with unwanted or unexpected changes to the operation. A careful WTI investigator will consider these pressures in his analysis.
c. The obvious cause of an explosion isn’t always the case. Only careful examination of the components, or in this case the component diagram revealed the full nature of why it occurred when it occurred.
d. Close partnership between lead investigators and scientific advisers is essential as is the ability to carry out experiments to test theories.
e. IED incident investigations were pretty good 150 years ago.

20th Century

Starinov, Krushchev and the radio-controlled explosive device

In my last post I promised a little more on Ilya Starinov, the Russian explosives expert and the godfather/grandfather of sabotage explosive attacks.  In the blog post on the F-10 explosive device I recounted how Starinov himself was directly involved in planting the F-10 radio controlled device that killed German General Braun in Kharkov in 1941, and this story relates to that incident directly.

The Russian retreat from Kharkhov was carefully planned. Hundreds of “stay-behind” explosive devices were left and Starinov was directly involved. Some of the explosive devices were on timers, some of them with victim-operated switches, and a good handful of F-10 radio controlled devices, these usually with very large charges associated with them. Furthermore there were large numbers of deliberate indications  left behind that the Russians created to give the impression of yet more devices to further slow the German progress into the region – holes in the ground, disturbed earth, and hoax devices where no device was actually planted, and sometimes devices laid on top of other hidden devices.  According to Soviet sources, 30,000 anti-tank mines were laid in and around Kharkov, about 1000 victim operated devices, and 2000 timed devices.

This anecdote relates to Starinov’s role in this and I cannot be certain it is true, but it is a story worth telling anyway.  A key individual in the Soviet forces in the region was Nikita Khrushchev, who apparently worked closely with Starinov. It is clear, with our view of history, that the Russians expected a significant German EOD effort – by November 1941 the pattern of “stay-behind” devices had been set, including the use of F-10 devices hidden in likely headquarter buildings to be occupied by advancing German forces  in Odessa and Kiev in previous months.

Here’s a pic of an F-10 device being removed from the Opera House in Kiev in October 1941, by a German EOD team. The distinctive construct of the F10 receiver is clear.

-and below is a fascinating Nazi propaganda film showing towards the end the explosive charges and German EOD team’s removal and inspection of the F-10 device itself recovered from the Kiev Opera House. Quite remarkable footage.

So Starinov was instrumental in the dummy devices, and the efforts to overwhelm, fool, distract and out-think the Wehrmacht engineers.   In the run up to the German advance, Krushchev’s headquarters was in a building in Dzerzhinskiy Street on Kharkov, in a building identified by Starinov as likely to be soon used as a German headquarters. Learning the lessons from Kiev, according to this story, two F-10 devices were planted, one hidden carefully below the other in the basement.  Interestingly Krushchev did not move out from the headquarters immediately, as he felt this might give an indication to the advancing Germans that the building was prepared with F-10 devices.  So clearly Krushchev and Starinov met and there was a degree of trust between the two. But remember, the political atmosphere within Soviet forces was febrile and senior officers were frequently “purged”, accused by Beria’s secret police. In some ways Starinov had been lucky to escape, but here we see perhaps a clue giving one reason he had evaded the purges.

As the Germans entered Kharkov, they did indeed , as Starinov expected, have some success at finding and rendering safe quite a number of explosive devices. Nazi propaganda was quick to trumpet these successes and their success against the “dastardly Bolshevik devices”. This apparent success was noticed by Beria’s secret police, who saw, perhaps, that the devices were being found too easily, giving the German’s success and suggested that something had been so planned by Starinov. The Nazi propaganda from the previous month of the device being found in Kiev would perhaps have added to their suspicions. Then General Braun’s staff made an announcement that they had “easily cleared the major part of the mines”.  The secret police prepared a case against Starinov, but Krushchev got to hear of it. He advised Starinov to detonate the two devices in the Dzerzinskiy Street Headquarters now, as predicted, occupied by General Braun.

According to the source I have found the “top” F-10 explosive device planted in the cellar had, as expected, been found, made safe and the initiation mechanism presented to General Braun, showing the headquarters was made safe. The now safe initiator sat on a desk in a main room. Accordingly Starinov, warned of the expected investigation by the secret police, ordered the first device initiated – and in the main hall of the German headquarters the receiver “clicked”, to the delight of the Wehrmacht.  Five minutes later the second device, still hidden deep under the building and with a massive charge attached to it received the necessary transmission… and General Braun and many of his staff perished in the explosion. Thus , Starinov’s investigation was dropped by the secret police, and he continued his career.

I should state that other sources slightly contradict this story – saying the “top device” designed to be found was a time delay device. But perhaps the story as detailed above makes a better story – I found it in a 1963 edition of Izvestiya, and it too may well be propaganda. The best stories often are. I do note that the Izvestiya report gets the wrong date attributing it to 1942 and not November 1941.

Here’s a picture of Starinov I have found. I’m not sure when this was taken but I suspect it was some years after the war. Starinov is the older man in civilian clothes pictured with serving Russian soldiers, perhaps those he was training in the late 1960s or 1970s.

Here’s another picture of Starinov taken, I think in the late 1980s.

 

And here, as young man being introduced to Marshal Klim Voroshilov.

The efforts of the German Wehrmacht EOD/Engineer units in dealing with the significant explosive threat in places like Kiev and Kharkov in 1941 probably deserve some attention.

 

 

1940-1950

The Russian IED connection

Last year I wrote two important blog pieces. The first was about the Russian IED expert Ilya Starinov – certainly the most important person in the history of explosive sabotage.  The second post was about the Russian F-10 radio controlled demolition device, used successfully by Starinov in WW2.

Since than I have been digging to find more details of Starinov’s devices, which I have finally successfully done, and there are some very interesting findings.    I’ve also uncovered other anecdotal stuff about Starinov and indeed about the broader history of IEDs which I’ll post in coming days and weeks.  I also have more technical detail on the F-10 to discuss in future posts.

Now, firstly, a caution. Some of the material I have found regarding the construction and design of certain IEDs could be abused by people with ill-intent. All the material I am going to post is unclassified, but I’m going to obscure parts of it and discuss things in some vague terms  to make it much less useful to those with criminal intent.  If you want to know the source and you know me or can prove you have a legitimate need to see the sources I am using, then get in touch. Otherwise I make no apology for being deliberately non-specific about some of this material. Now, I found the source of this material on line, and others may be able too, but I am going to limit my helpfulness towards those who shouldn’t have this detail.  If you want to challenge my assessments and why I draw the conclusions I reach below, I’m very happy to do this off-line.  This means, perhaps, you are going to have to trust me on some of my assessments. Or not!  Finally I should also point out, sadly, that there is no shortage of detailed technical instructions for miscreants to find how to make bigger and better IEDs then these here discussed in an openly available 70-year-old document, discussing devices from the Eastern Front in 1942.  The horse of IED knowledge bolted a long time ago.  Close the stable door if you can – I can’t.

The document I found was developed not from Russian sources, but from US sources, who clearly in the immediate post-war period of 1945-1950 had access to German Wehrmacht engineers reports. These engineers had conducted thousands of successful EOD operations. By gleaning reports of Soviet demolition activity, dealt with by the German engineers in WW2, the US military tried to gain a greater understanding of Soviet capabilities in the 1950s. So this was real technical intelligence on Soviet explosive technology, and explosive sabotage tactics, as the Cold War span up.  So here we have, in 2020, the opportunity to examine 1950s US military technical intelligence, derived from Nazi German technical intelligence from the period 1940-1945, about Russian explosive devices.  So this isn’t exactly a primary source.  But some of the detail I’m going to show you makes me convinced this is worthwhile, valuable historical material, and there are certain aspects which surprised me.

Firstly to remind you of the context. It is apparent that the Soviet soldier of WW2 was pretty familiar with improvising explosives charges, either using his own munitions or captured German munitions. The Germans state that the Russian soldier is “particularly ingenious in installing improvised mines and booby traps“. During the latter part of WW2, the Russian use of sabotage explosive devices went way beyond anything seen before or since. Furthermore partisans in Eastern European countries were trained to improvise yet further. Thousands of railway lines, trains and vehicles were attacked explosively by Russians or Russian sponsored partisans in eastern Europe. Much of this was coordinated by Ilya Starinov, who also designed explosive devices , trained the perpetrators and on many occasions planted key devices himself. Starinov survived numerous purges, and went on to develop spetzntaz units and tactics, and taught revolutionaries around the world in the 1950s and 1960s.

In this first post, I’m going to highlight some very interesting similarities between Soviet sabotage devices from WW2 and (get this) IRA devices of the 1970’s, 1980’s and even 1990’s.  These similarities go beyond just application of general explosive/sabitage principles – there are significant design similarities in aspects of the devices.  Here’s some examples, and a final, highly technical device that I won’t comment on too deeply.

  1. Firstly there is the use of specific component items.  In the 1970s and into the 1990s, many PIRA devices encountered in the UK had firing or arming switches as part of the circuitry. In the vast majority of cases, in what was termed “Time and Power Units” (TPUs) this switch consisted of an adapted wooden springed clothes peg help open with a wooden dowel. Here’s a demonstration circuit showing the “IRA technique”.
  2. The clothes peg was wired so that a switch closed when an insulator was removed from the jaws of the peg, arming this device. In the 1950 document I have found. German engineers describe this exact concept being found in Russian devices in the early 1940s. Here’s a pic:  

3. In the late 1980s, PIRA developed the “Mk 12” mortar as British Forces called it. This was followed in 1993 by the smaller “Mk16” Mortar. These were missiles that had a shaped charge in its front end, a hollow pipe behind it containing a fuze and tail fins to stabilise in flight.  This wasn’t really a mortar but a horizontally fired missile typically fired at vehicles. It had a shaped charge warhead and a fuze set in the hollow tube behind, with simple fns to stabilise  it in its short flight.  Here’s  a picture of a PIRA Mk 12 Mortar. disassembled:

4. In WW2 Russian partisans developed a device that is remarkably similar. Not tube-launched but built for a similar purpose and with almost identical design principles. Here’s the pic from the 1950 report:

5.  The Russians also concentrated significantly on additional circuits or mechanisms to booby trap charges. By introducing anti-handling and anti-lift charges, several of the devices used by the Soviets appear remarkably similar to what the British EOD community of the 1970’s refer to as “Castlerobin” devices. I’m not going to discuss this further here. But clearly there is a thought-process going on to prevent the render safe of devices, and target the EOD operator. The parallels in design are clear.

6. The creation of devices which target EOD activities went a step further with the introduction of a RF sensitive switch designed to initiate an explosive device when certain mine detection equipment was used. This was fielded in December 1943.  Some of this equipment was captured by the Wehrmacht in January 1944, and rapidly exploited.  70 years later , technology which is triggered by the RF signature of certain EOD equipments would be regarded as a very high threat indeed – yet, here the Russians were in the early 1940s developing such technology. The device responded to a frequency of 800-2000Hz at short range, emitted by German EOD equipment. What is more, the Germans recognised the importance of such an advance, examined the Russian technology, identified some flaws, and developed their own version of the equipment. They also developed technical solutions to the threat.   I find that remarkable, and some of you will share my surprise for reasons we won’t go into. Here’s an excerpt from the report showing the circuit to prove it is what I say it is – (I have obscured part of it for reasons explained earlier).

To be clear in my assessments: I’m not saying that the IRA devices of the late twentieth century were designed by the Russians – just that there are some odd parallels, that may be coincidences. Direct influence is possible but so, theoretically, is the potential for the IRA to have got hold of the American report written in the 1950s. It’s not secret.  But we shouldn’t underestimate the fact that Starinov was training revolutionaries from around the world. I do think that these parallels once again highlight the importance of understanding the history of IEDs.  The fact that Russian devices were so focused on countering EOD action is interesting and significant and deserves wider understanding.  The general under-appreciation of the extensive, WW2 Russian sabotage campaigns using improvised explosive devices is barely recognised and deserves a much greater level of attention. Frankly it makes the efforts of the British SOE or American OSS look very paltry in comparison.

In future blogs related to all this I will address the following:

  1. Some Russian devices designed specifically for targeting railways – further to my series in the subject. Some were designed by Starinov himself.
  2. More technical details of the Russian F-10 radio controlled device.
  3. Some more details and photographs of Ilya Starinov, and an interesting story about the F-10 radio-controlled devices he deployed to assassinate German General General Braun in Kharkov in November 1941, and the role of a young commissar called Krushchev (yes, that one) in the operation, protecting Starinov from being arrested by Beria’s agents and “purged” before the device was detonated.
  4. An odd and fascinating series of parallels between this 1950s American report and another American report written in 1865 showing almost identical devices. History repeating itself again. Some of the Russian devices of WW2 are identical to Russian devices of the 1850s, and some other Russian devices of WW2 are very similar to American revolutionary devices of 1778.

All in all, this document is a bit of a treasure trove when put within the larger context of the history of IEDs over several centuries.

 

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