Standing Well Back
EOD responses

More Black Box Thinking

My article here , on the subject of “Black Box Thinking” and other supporting activities has now been reproduced in a number of professional journals within the EOD community, namely the C-IED Journal,  “The Detonator” (the Journal of the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators), and this month will be featured in the Journal of the Institute of Explosive Engineers.

I continue to be struck be the lessons for the EOD community that can be learned from the aviation industry. One of the most high profile proponents of what Matthew Syed calls Black Box Thinking of that activity, Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenbeger is interviewed here and it’s well worth a read.  Sully is elsewhere quoted as saying:

“Everything we know in aviation, every rule in the book, every procedure we have, we know because someone died. We have purchased at great cost, lessons bought with blood that we have to preserve as institutional knowledge.”

So, a challenge. Can we in the EOD community look in the mirror and say we have valued every drop of blood spilled by our community?  Have we wrung every lesson learned dry, examined our failures and treated them as lessons to be learned by the entire community and thus honoured their sacrifice?  Can we honour and respect those named on our memorials if we don’t bother to understand exactly the lessons they provide us? Do we, as a community, have exemplary post incident or post “near-miss” investigative procedures? Do our policies encourage the admission of errors without penalty?  Do we have the hard data to support our policy development or are we still doing it by seat-of-the-pants anecdote?  Are our rank structures and organisational frameworks road-blocking rational self examination?  Is it too difficult? Is it too much to ask?

We too have experience bought in blood, but have we valued it?

19th Century

1894 Bomb Disposal Techniques

I have blogged before at an IED disposal system and associated organisation set up in Paris, France in the late part of the 19th century.  In my earlier blogs I have discussed the “containment vehicle” used to transport suspect IEDs to one of four disposal sites set up around Paris, and the use of hydraulic presses to dismantle IEDs once taken thefre.

I have recovered a little more detail about both, in some reports written by Colonel Majendie, the British explosives expert, who visited Paris in early 1894 and considered the techniques being used , adapting some for use in London.

Firstly the vehicle and containment system, originally material posted here.   Here now is Majendie’s description:

 

The bomb is deposited on a quantity of wood shavings or similar elastic material in the body of the phaeton….At one time the idea was entertained of constructing a bomb proof cart for this purpose – or at any rate a cart by which by mans of iron shields would prevent the lateral dispersion of fragments should the bomb unfortunately explode in transit. But the idea was abandoned in view of the fact that infernal machines in some cases contained very large charges of explosives (e.g the machine which exploded at the Rue de Clichy contained between 50 and 60 lbs), and of the considerations, 1st. that the cart which would resist the explosion of such a charge would be proportionally inconvenient to bring into action, besides attracting much attention… and that in the event of a bomb containing a charge in excess of what the cart was calculated to resist exploding therein, the iron and stout structure of the cart itself would probably seriously aggravate the effect.  

Majendie goes on to discuss that the presses available at each of the four disposal sites (which are pictured i the earlier post referenced above) which often succeeded in dismantling the IEDs without them exploding, but on occasion when an explosion did occur, its effect was usually “greatly diminished” by cracking of the outer shell.  Interestingly Majendie also reported three other techniques used during EOD operations:

a. Sometimes small dynamite charges were used to open the container of a bomb.

b. The French also used a mechanical device with three movable arms, or “holders” into which IEDs of different sizes can be fixed and lowered into a bath of mercury. Some devices were sealed with the use of solder and by immersing that part in mercury, for about 24 hours, caused the tin in the solder to dissolve breaking any soldered seal.

c. if the team attending the site of an incident felt it too dangerous to move they would “blow in place”. Majendie disagreed with this approach and recommended a degree of risk to avoid inadvertently seconding and supplementing the anarchist’s intentions.

As a result of the visit, Majendie developed the small, light handcart for transporting devices, that I showed in an earlier post here. The first of London’s disposal facilities was set up in 1894 on Duck Island , with others planned at Hyde Park, the Tower of London and in some circumstances a facility at Woolwich.   Later, in 1895, a truck was provided for transporting devices to the disposal facility by the War Office.  Two years later in 1896, the French authorities were using the first X-ray imaging systems to examine suspect IEDs.

EOD Psychology

EOD and Black Box Thinking

The EOD profession is one where lives are often at risk during operations.  Many hundreds of lives have been lost over the decades on EOD operations of various kinds.  Many more have been injured. There have been an uncountable number of “near misses”.  But proportionally only a tiny few of these incidents ever get fed back to improve future EOD operations.

This article takes the position that the EOD profession’s cultural approach to risk has been, and still is, seriously flawed and much more can and should be done to develop what might be described as “open loop” reporting and “Black Box” thinking.   I believe that EOD practitioners and C-IED operators in particular deserve better – and the hurdles that seem to be actively preventing such a cultural change need to be pushed out of the way. The status quo of accepting the current flawed and dysfunctional approach to adverse incidents whether they cause casualties or are simply “near misses” is morally unsustainable.  Nobody wants to fail and we all want to succeed.  But at a collective level, if we don’t admit and learn from mistakes, and create a culture where mistakes are recognised as opportunities to learn, then we will never move forward. The benefits of such thinking are not just in human lives. EOD Operations can become more efficient and effective by rational examination of mistakes.  There is a need for a profound change.  All too often the EOD profession at best only investigates casualties if caused on an EOD operation.  Near misses generally get ignored and swept under a carpet.  Too often even if investigations occur, they are frequently closed loop investigations with limited value, and blinkered, limited outputs.

Other professions too deal with risks to lives, and they have remarkably different responses – some of them outstanding and some dreadful. The EOD profession can learn from the good and recognise weaknesses in others that have strong similarities.   In the last few years, technological developments are now able to provide systems to support a new approach and this article will touch on some of those.

Let’s look at two contrasting examples of how other professions deal with the issues of concern.

Aviation

Barely one hundred years ago, flying an aircraft was an incredibly risky activity.  Technology was new, engineering of aircraft was still exploratory and safety systems were usually non-existent. In 1912, eight of fourteen US Army pilots died in crashes.  Training schools had a 25% fatality rate.   More recently, at the end of WW2, the first British jet fighter, the Meteor, suffered about 450 crashes. It was worrying but an accepted risk.  Being a pilot of any aircraft was risky and dangerous.  Any aircraft was a risky and dangerous thing to travel in.   But in 2013 there were 36.4 million commercial flights worldwide, carrying 3 billion passengers worldwide.  Only 210 of those passengers died, at an accident rate of one accident per 2.4 million flights. The reason for that is not just improved technology. What has also happened is an entire cultural change across a global industry. That is confirmed by the fact that members of the International Air Transport Association, which has more stringent procedures, have one accident every 8.3 million take offs, using pretty much the same technology as the rest of the industry.  What is accepted in the aviation industry as a cultural norm is that errors and mistakes are reported and that errors and mistakes are an opportunity to learn and improve.   In aviation two things have combined beautifully – technology and culture. In terms of technology, information to diagnose technical faults is much improved, quality systems have ensured components are correctly fitted, and communications and IT allow 24/7 monitoring of critical systems. Culturally there is a clear recognition that it is impossible for a pilot to learn every mistake personally – and that a global reporting system allows iterative improvement of training, drills, procedures and critical incident management so that success spirals up built on the mistakes of others. The industry accepts and understands that monitoring and recognising failure leads to lives being saved. A mistake or an error is seen as an opportunity to improve. Crucially the egos and the hierarchical sensitivities of pilots and crew are being recognised, and systems adapted accordingly.

Healthcare

Mathew Syed in his recent book “Black Box Thinking” compared the healthcare industry in terms of how errors and mistakes were addressed to the aviation industry.  There are obvious differences in that only in rare cases are doctors and nurses lives put at risk.  But with some notable exceptions, the healthcare industry is prone to mistakes and generally has a poor cultural attitude to such errors and mistakes.  In 1999 the American Institute of Medicine reported that between 44,000 and 98,000 die every year as a result of preventable medical errors. A separate assessment concluded that over a million patients are injured every year during hospital treatment and that 120,000 patients a year die as a result of mistakes. A more recent study in 2014 suggests that figure may be much higher.  That’s the equivalent of a lot of jumbo jets crashing. Errors occur in a variety of ways. Misdiagnosis, application of wrong treatment, poor communication, stress and overwork are common factors.  What is becoming apparent however is that mistakes have patterns.   Certain sets of circumstances lead to increased likelihood of mistakes.  A medical error has a path or a trajectory, that if the system was able to highlight could warn medical practitioners that they were entering dangerous territory.   Healthcare has another “built-in” problem, and that’s the medical hierarchy of senior doctors, junior doctors, nurses and support staff.  It’s not suggested that this hierarchy needs doing away with but all to often medical mistakes are happening because of a poor flow of communication upwards or downwards of the clinical management chain. Importantly this hierarchy seems to lead to ineffective investigations, if they happen at all.  In healthcare competence is equated to clinical perfection.    A recent European study established that 70% of doctors recognised that they should report errors, but only 32% said they actually did so, and in reality, even that number has to be exaggerated. In healthcare around the world the culture has been one of blame and hierarchy.  I wonder how many EOD operators would willingly report an error they had made?

Now, I would posit that currently the EOD profession has much more in common with current healthcare than current aviation.    In EOD operations accidents happen for a variety of reasons. Amongst them are misdiagnosis, application of the wrong treatment, poor communication, stress, and overwork.    There are other similarities that can be drawn between EOD and healthcare with regard to investigation or inquiries. But in EOD we can also blame a proactive enemy.   Most EOD units are military or police based, with the concomitant disciplinary ethos.  This leads to adversarial investigations when things go wrong and is one of the crucial hurdles to overcome and where attitudes and culture need to change.   Investigations are strange things and I’ve participated in a number.  Most investigations tend to stop when they find the individual or group closest to the accident who could have made a different decision, apportion the blame there and then close the investigation.   There is rarely an understanding that mistakes are made due to much more complex contexts or series of events, and little effort is made to define that pathway of context in such a way that it can be characterised and used in the future as a “flag”, warning when circumstances begin to lead down the wrong path.     A key issue is the fact that there is confusion and too often a dysfunctional link between an investigation to find the cause of an accident and the disciplinary requirement to apportion blame to an individual.  This is the nub of the issue and the EOD community will always belong to strictly hierarchical organisations which are naturally inclined to require the apportion of blame.  Somehow we have to change that attitude and recognise that there is a greater good than the need to blame individuals.  In EOD, strangely, competence is also equated with perfection, and that’s simply unrealistic. That attitude is not even applied with rigour – with perfection being defined as “nobody got hurt this time”.  As a community we have to address that attitude.

One particular technique that has been introduced in the aviation industry over the years, and is slowly being adopted in the healthcare profession is called “Crew Resource Management” or CRM.  CRM is the careful use of a number of strategies to improve dynamic dialogue within a small team during a crisis.  To me, the small team of an EOD response team working at an incident is directly analogous to the aircrew on a flight deck, or a surgical team in an operating theatre.   The stresses are the same, the hierarchy is similar and the need for an effective dialogue between the team members is crucial.  CRM addresses situational awareness, self awareness, leadership, assertiveness, decision making, flexibility and adaptability within the team.   If one studies the nature of crises in aircraft and in operating theatres and match these, where possible, with the situations seen at IED response situations, there are startling similarities.

In a crisis, perception narrows. This is a standard physiological response to high stress. It is seen on flight decks and in operating theatres where key members of the team (such as the pilot or lead surgeon) become engrossed with solving a particular problem, ignoring other factors, especially time. Awareness of other issues affecting the incident drops sometimes remarkably.  I’ve seen it personally in the command posts of an IED response incidents.  CRM can address this issue by teaching other team members to intervene effectively, forcing, appropriately a broader view on the team leader.  It is not easy and it requires training and the use of a few key techniques.  But I’m excited by the potential of CRM to have a significant impact on improving safety and indeed the broader efficiency of EOD operations.

Historically EOD procedures have evolved, of course, by some form of analysis of previous successes and failures.  I’m not suggesting that the profession should throw the baby out with the bath water and start afresh.  But these historical developments were rarely built on volumes of validated data.  They were usually built by careful consideration of a mix of actual reports from first and second hand sources, from instinct, from conjecture, and without the hard data that perhaps we can utilise today. There is an opportunity to be seized today, that modern technology can facilitate for us. Many years ago, I was one of these people working out procedures for the EOD unit I had operated in and then commanded. I did my best, I learned from the experience of others, I thought. But looking back my abilities were lacking in terms of understanding the limitations of human psychology. And I also lacked primary data sources.   At best I had the reports of the operators themselves, completed “after the operation”, when a narrative cognitive bias or fallacy had time to establish itself in the mind of the operator. Addressing such human cognitive biases is tricky, and frankly my own understanding of such things limited the value of my task.   It worries me that it has taken me nearly 20 years since I commanded that Unit to learn enough lessons about human psychology to realise I did a sub-optimal job back in the day.

So, here are suggested four measures which if introduced could bring to the EOD profession a measure of the Black Box thinking from which much could be learned and lives saved:

1.   CRM could be easily introduced as a training culture.  I accept that finding any time for training is easier said than done, but it appears the benefits would be clear. CRM training methodologies are already refined and ready for easy adaptation into the EOD community.  I don’t doubt that the hierarchy of rank and experience is an issue that will need careful handling in certain EOD units. Conversely I have seen a more collegiate response of “equals” in a bomb squad also deteriorate into a self justifying loop. CRM should address this too.  Introducing CRM will vary in its challenges between the different cultures in different EOD environments.   CRM can, I believe, also incorporate referral to outside entities for technical support and authorisation – again training here might better enable the operator to brief his commander and seek authority for an off-SOP approach – and technology too can assist this with video and images.

2.    There are already technical solutions to the “Black Box” concept on the market.  The “Scimitar” system is a good example, the principle of “the internet of things” makes it inevitable that all component systems of an EOD operation, including communications, CREW/ECM, video, audio, GPS, tools and indeed operator physiology will be fitted with sensors reporting (securely) to a data repository for subsequent analysis. The Scimitar tool (see image) gathers a range of geo and sensory data from individuals, and equipment within an EOD operation, as well as communications logs and videos.

So the operator and No2 are geo located with a personal tag, as is the ROV, along with its video stream. The data is presented in a variety of ways. The image shows a map overlay showing assets deployed to an EOD operation with various thumbnails presented of different video images. Along the horizontal is a timeline showing sensor captured events.  This is, in effect, a black box for a bomb squad.  It can be used as a post event tool, or even as a live briefing tool. Clearly, establishing such data collection in an EOD team must not be a logistic drag, and the intensity of certain EOD engagements on military operations in recent years has been remarkable – but all the more need to capture data automatically in these scenarios.  Analytical tools will be able to spot error signatures and feed that back into debriefings, training and corrective procedural measures.  Investigations will pin-point those errors which can be eliminated giving the operator and other operators value from the mistakes that he made.  This can be done with relative ease with technology such as this. There are benefits too for the manufacturers who facilitate or provide this – they too can improve their products by careful analysis of the data. Aviation has a system which modern technology now allows to be a data-rich arena of information. Aviation safety has recognised this and optimised it, and continues to develop this concept. Now is the time for the EOD community to recognise that with some modern technology, an EOD operation can become a data rich environment, full of useful data and consequently lessons to be learned.  I fully expect such lessons to assist a broader improvement in operational efficiency rather than just concentrating on safety issues.  I suspect that the “Return on Investment” will be surprisingly good.

3.    Developing a common and radical post-incident investigation toolbox will of course be difficult to achieve, but I sense that very few EOD organisations have recently looked objectively at the the way they conduct such investigations. There is much to learn from other industries and developments in the psychological understanding of how individuals respond in stressful environments has much to offer.   There is no reason why this revision should not be embraced by a number of national and international organisations and provided pro-bono globally.  Thus, even if an issue cannot be shared internationally for reasons of security sensitivity at least a commonly accepted “best practice” of investigation will be applied that might be able to be of use. And the “best practice” should proactively identity where such information can and should be shared outside the unit and even internationally for the benefit of other bomb technicians.

4.    The last of course, is the most difficult to achieve, that of changing cultures from the top to the bottom.  There will be plenty who balk at them all citing hurdles such as security.  But there have been some steps. The IED IMPACT program (www.IEDIMPACT.net) gives EOD warriors the opportunity to pass back their lessons learned in frank and candid ways.  These wounded warriors, having suffered, really don’t want others to repeat their errors and their testimonies are powerful and moving. No-one thinks any the less of them for being involved in an incident. We think all the more of them because they are prepared to stand up and point out how things could have been done better. International organisations such as IABTI and the Institute of Explosives Engineers can pick up this thread and drive it forward internationally.  Leadership is needed not just from these organisations but from within the current leadership of all EOD units and national authorities.  This wont be easy – look how poor we are as an international community on sharing technical intelligence on IEDs – but we must strive to bypass these parochial hurdles.

Learn from the mistakes of others. You can’t live long enough to make them all yourself.

(This article was first published in “Counter-IED Report, Winter 2015/2016” and is reproduced here by kind permission of the Editor.)

1570-1580

Historical ROVs

Recently I had a dialogue with some colleagues as I researched modern versions of this very early piece of EOD equipment from 1573.

A remarkably similar piece of equipment was in operational use only 45 years ago and I was seeking a photo of the equipment in use in the 1960’s/1970s. I’m still digging on that.

Anyway the dialogue with a few modest practitioners of the art of EOD in the 1970s took me in an interesting direction, and I’ve turned up some interesting stuff from much earlier on the subject of ROVs.  The general perception of the world we live in is that the tracked ROV as used in EOD is a very modern invention. Manufacturers produce glitzy videos showing these twin-tracked vehicles performing tricks as the operator remains a safe distance behind, secure from the hazards that their robotic buddy faces. All very High-Tech.  I used to work for one such manufacturer, and we have all seen the videos showing the technological prowess of a wide range of differing modern ROVs.   Like many, I assumed that the tracked ROV was essentially invented for the purpose of EOD in the dark days of the early 1970s.  But it appears that ROVs were around for a considerable time before the 1970s.  This does not to lessen in any way the significant innovative effort that went into the development of the “wheelbarrow” series of ROVs and all subsequent EOD “robotics”, but there are some fascinating precedents.

I began by searching for images of the first ROVs in Northern Ireland in about 1972, in the hope that they might also show images of the protective screen I was looking for so I could do a visual comparison. Suddenly I came across a picture in some archives that made me sit up.  You should understand that my operational experience was largely in the 1990s so I’m most familiar with Mk8 “wheelbarrow” ROV.  But I came across the image which at first glance appeared to show a number of Mk 8 Chassis…. but from WW2… How could that be?


British soldiers with captured Goliaths


US Navy examine captured Goliaths on Utah Beach 11 June 1944

For comparison here’s  a picture of a Mk 8 wheelbarrow – note that the main body of the Mk 8 is remarkably similar to the images above in terms of shape and scale.

The WW2 item turns out to be of a system called Goliath. It’s not an EOD ROV, but rather its a remotely controlled demolition vehicle.

When you think that probably there were only a couple of hundred Mk 8 wheelbarrows produced in the 1980s and 1990s, but there were many thousand “Goliath” ROVs produced.  The Goliath ROVs were initially electrically powered but later used a small two cylinder engine.  Here’s a great shot from the top, showing the engine and the wire spooling from the rear.

I also found reference to a Japanese tracked ROV, also used a a remote demolition tool – called the “I-GO” developed in 1937. How strange that the nomenclature predates the “I-Robot”


Japanese I-GO ROV from 1937

Now in the early 1990s some of the Northern Ireland EOD units developed a deployment technique called the “Rapid Deployment Trolley”.  This was a cobbled together wheeled trolley on which we placed the Mk 8 wheelbarrow ROV to transport it rapidly to and from a small helicopter in emergency situations where a full deployment requiring a large helicopter wasn’t possible. So it was with delight I saw that Germans in WW2 also had such a “trolley” for the Goliath – and actually theirs looked much better engineered!. Vorsprung Durch Technic.


Wheeled Trolley for moving Goliath ROVs


A Goliath being moved on its wheeled Trolley, Warsaw

Then as I was researching the provenance of the German Goliath I came across reference to the genesis of this equipment… It turns out that the German Goliath was based on an ROV developed by the French in the years running up to WW2….  Supposedly, as the Germans advanced on Paris the inventor, Adolphe Kegresse threw the prototype into the Seine, but somehow the Nazis got wind of this, reverse-engineered it, and ended up building the Goliath.  I have also found reference to the Germans recovering , later, Kegresse’s blueprints for the ROV and reverse engineering their ROV from that.


The French Kegresse ROV, 1940

I then found details of  British tracked ROV, developed in 1940 by Metropolitan Vickers, again as a remote demolition tool. Here’s an image – note the interesting inwardly facing track extensions.


Vickers MLM ROV, 1940

50 of these Vickers MLMs were built before the project was suspended in 1944.  I have a copy of a Canadian officer’s trial report if anyone is interested.  The ROV had a range of 1100 yards and could carry 120lbs of Ammonal. Initiation was either by a command signal or a contact switch (which had a command safety override).

I then found a reference to an American ROV from WW1. This is the Wickersham Land Torpedo, built in 1918, possibly 1917 but patented in 1922. Here’s the link to the patent. They were manufactured by the Caterpillar company, I think.

 


Wickerhsam Land Torpedo

This ROV looks similar in size shape and design to a modern day Talon EOD ROV, or a Dragon Runner. The Wickersham and the Kegresse ROVs look pretty similar.

I kept digging and encountered 2 more tracked ROvs that predates the American one – both French.

The first of these was the “torpille terrestre electrique”  (electrical land torpedo), developed by M. Gabet and M. Aubriot in 1915. It could carry 200kgs of explosive and was wire guided of course.  I’m intrigued that the single lever track at the rear looks a little like the lever track on some modern robots.

The second of these was the “Schnieder Crocodile” also developed in 1915 and trialled by many Allied nations, including the British, Belgian, Italian and Russians.


“Crocodiles” Schneider type B.

It could carry 40kg of explosives and looks similar in size, shape and scale to the Allen-Vanguard ROV

So it seems that next year will be the centenary of the tracked ROV…

 

Author
1880-1890

IED Response Operations 1880 – 1910

For some time now I have been digging slowly and methodically for details of late 19th century techniques for dealing with IEDs, mainly focused on the activities of the London based Colonel Vivian Majendie. As the Chief Inspector of Explosives he had a broad ranging role, including legislation regarding the industrial production and storage of explosives.  But Majendie was also responsible for the response to anarchist and Fenian revolutionary IEDs which were remarkably prevalent at the time.  Remember that the 1890s, for instance, were referred to as “the decade of the bomb” because of the prevalence of explosive devices.

I have mentioned in previous blogs that Majendie constructed a “secret” facility for rendering safe IEDs. His work there was assisted by Dr August Dupre – a German emigre and highly experienced chemist. This facility was surprisingly just a couple of hundred yards from Downing Street on Duck Island at the bottom end of the lake in St James’s Park, opposite Horseguards.

There is a story that the bomb defusing facility still existed in mothballs in the 1970s. To preserve it, the wooden building and its contents were recovered by the Royal Engineers to Chatham in Kent. The story goes that some RE quartermaster in the 1980s felt it was messing up his stores so it was destroyed and scrapped. Sigh. In such a way is Ozymandias sometimes forgotten.

So for a couple of decades I’ve been interested in what equipment existed there – but Majendie’s OPSEC was pretty good.  I think I know where some official files may be that detail it but time has precluded a visit to those archives yet.

But yesterday I turned up a new lead.  Firstly I found a document that detailed some of Majendie’s thoughts on EOD operations. He discussed moving suspect devices in wicker hand carts to one of three locations strategically placed around London. One on Duck Island – close to the heart of government in Whitehall and sufficiently remote in its immediate environment.  One in the “ditch” surrounding the Tower of London, for IEDs found in the financial centre of London, and one in a cutting or quarry in Hyde Park for devices in the commercial district.  It appears that Majendie won approval for the construction of at least two of these (Hyde Park and Duck Island) and that the Duck Island facility was completed first.  But not much of a clue as to what it contained, other than some sort of mechanical contrivance for dealing with the infernal machines. So a bit more digging ensued. Now, I know from other research that Majendie conducted close relations with both the United States and with France. Anarchist IEDs were almost endemic in France at the time. Majendie makes some remark in the 1880s that he has “adapted the French techniques” and refers to their approach as often blowing the devices up in place – whereas Majendie prefers to move them to his secret facilities to deal with them there.

But then I find an associated reference that suggests that Majendie used equipment of the same kind for defusing bombs that the French used at the Municipal Laboratory in Paris.  A clue, then, and a new avenue.

So, I’ve had some success.

This is a summary of what I have found.  The French authorities established a Municipal Laboratory for dealing with IEDs in some open ground near Porte de Vincennes in Paris and others at 3 other locations elsewhere in the City.  The facility consisted of some earth banks and a series of wooden huts. I think the facility was set up in the 1880s and certainly was still in existence in 1910. This is an image from 1910.

Within this facility was a range of equipment including x-ray equipment (after it was invented) and a very robust piece of machinery called a “Morane Press”.  I think this is that key piece of equipment and I have a hunch (nothing more) that Majendie’s facility on Duck Island was somewhat similar in terms of construction, and Majendie too may have used a Morane press. This is a picture of the “Morane press” taken at he the Paris facility, again somewhat later but the press was still in use in 1910.

I then found a beautiful report from 1906 describing the operational routine of the Paris police at the time. The report describes that the occurrence of suspect IEDs in Paris in 1906 was “not at all an infrequent occurrence”.  Some elements of the report:

  • A “bomb squad’ was based at the laboratory and connected by a telephone to central police headquarters.  The headquarters tasked the unit to respond to a suspect IED. The response is described as being similar to a “fire call”.
  • The lead EOD tech has a fast response vehicle, described as a 16 horsepower “racing bodied” automobile. it is followed by an “automobile bomb van”.
  • Six chemists are assigned to the unit, and one always deploys as the lead operator. They work one week shifts, and five weeks off to “recover from nerves”
  • The lead chemist brings the “bomb van” close to the device, and the operator after inspecting it, lifts it carefully , maintaining its positional attitude and places it in a containment box. Perhaps their procedures had evolved from the 1880s “blow in place” policy.

The photograph below may show the response vehicle and a containment vessel.  I can’t be sure because I think the photo was mislabelled as “Paris police headquarters, 1920s” but I found the photo amongst other photos of the explosive laboratory and to my untrained eye the vehicle looks like a 1906 car not a 1920s car. I think the black object on the floor might be a containment vessel. The operators are certainly steely-eyed.

  • The report describes how many IEDs of the time were sensitive to movement which changed its orientation – the initiation mechanism was two liquids which, if the device was tilted, mixed and caused a detonation.
  • The bomb van is described a “heavy (voiture lourde) double phaeton 12 hp automobile, refitted from the regular tourist trade, with a pneumatic spring device for gentle running and 120mm tires”
  • The “bomb box” or containment vessel is placed over the rear springs, opening by a letdown from behind. It is fitted with shredded wood fibre and into this is placed the IED.
  • The IED is then moved accordingly to the facility in Porte de Vincennes or one of three other such facilities strategically placed around the City ( note the similarity to Majendie’s plan) . The concept is to move the device very quickly in case it is time-initiated.
  • Once at the facility the device is immediately x-rayed after being placed behind an armoured screen. As noted in earlier posts, the French deployed x-ray equipment for security operations within months of the invention in 1896.
  • At this stage, depending on the x-ray, the device may be manually rendered safe. The report mentions a specific IED were the hands of the timing clock could be seen to be stationary from analysis of the radiograph, allowing a manual procedure to make the device safe.
  • The report then describes the “hydraulic press”. It is tucked in behind earthen mounds. Here’s a picture of what I think is the pump that powered the Morane press.

  • And here are the earthen mounds surrounding the facility

  • The press is used to dismantle IEDs, and if a detonation is caused, the effects are contained. The press is robust enough to survive. Quite often there are detonations several times a week. The effectiveness of the press is described as 75% – three times out of four a device does not explode but the components are recovered for forensic examination.  That’s not a bad strike rate at all, given the sensitive explosives used and the initiation types.
  • The report also stresses how many of the IEDs are not publicly reported in order to keep the public calm

In summary then I think that the Paris facilities are a remarkable reminder that IEDs are not new, and surges in IED use have been seen before. The facility seems to have been in use for about thirty years, and despite the different techniques of today’s bomb squads, their technology was surprisingly effective.  We can’t be certain that Majendie was using the same strategy and same technology in London in the 1890s but I think there is a high degree of likelihood he was. Like today, there was a willingness to share EOD technology, and technical intelligence, between different national agencies. The Paris police clearly had a sophisticated and well resourced EOD unit operating across their city, with a thought-through strategy focused on:

  • reducing damage to property
  • returning the situation to normality as soon as possible
  • technical intelligence and forensically-focused render-safe procedures.
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