EOD Psychology – A technique for forcing System 2 thinking in EOD operations
In previous posts I have discussed some thought on EOD Psychology inspired by Daniel Kahnemann’s book “Thinking Fast and Slow” where the concepts of “System 1 and System 2 thinking are explored. In very simple terms an EOD operator should utilize “System 1” automatic thinking (by the use of drills) to enable speed within a framework of good principles. However when something goes wrong or when the unexpected happens or appears, EOD operators must switch to “system 2 “careful analytical thought. The challenge is that some EOD operators (probably most) struggle with this change. In some cases there is strong evidence to suggest, I believe, that system 2 is not engaged and an operator fools himself into thinking he has carefully thought through the issues, and is free from psychological biases when he is not. It’s then that people die.
Links to previous posts for any reader who wishes to see my earlier posts are here
http://www.standingwellback.com/home/2009/7/28/bomb-technician-training-and-psychology.html
http://www.standingwellback.com/home/2009/8/5/testing-intuition.html
http://www.standingwellback.com/home/2011/10/9/why-do-bomb-techs-do-stupid-things.html
http://www.standingwellback.com/home/2011/10/11/why-do-bomb-techs-do-stupid-things-part-two.html
http://www.standingwellback.com/home/2011/10/24/bomb-technicians-and-psychology.html
http://www.standingwellback.com/home/2011/11/1/eod-operators-are-not-rational.html
http://www.standingwellback.com/home/2011/11/3/eod-psychology-playing-doctors-and-nurses.html
http://www.standingwellback.com/home/2011/11/4/things-you-cant-do-in-a-bomb-suit.html
To this I’m feeding in concepts of narrative psychology where humans look to fit unknowns into a narrative, and the dangers of that in that we look to fit information into an existing simple narrative rather than develop a new complex narrative. I’m now also drawing on a CIA publication ‘The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis’ by Richard J Heuer, Jr. available here under “1999”.
Although this latter reference is the understanding of psychology with regard to intelligence matters, I think there is an excellent “read across” to the EOD world.
In particular Part III of this latter reference examines cognitive biases where errors in analytical thought are caused by simple strategies. I recommend a wade through this document. In fact if I had a chance I’d make a read of it mandatory for EOD operators.
One point it makes is that we perceive what we expect to perceive, and we look for indicators to reinforce our pre-conceptions rather than focus on indicators which suggest alternate explanations. This is fundamentally true in EOD threat assessments as well as intelligence analysis. It is this element that I’m currently focusing on. This research has allowed me now to begin to develop some suggested mental tools for EOD operators and I’d like to humbly present the first one now.
This first tool is one that increases “self awareness” in a situation where System 2 thinking might be demanded. I am calling the tool the PRE-MORTEM. The tool attempts to force, indeed “shock” the brain into considering other threats and forces the individual to consider issues that he has ruled out during his Threat Assessment. Here it is:
On any EOD operation where time allows, after the operator has conducted his threat assessment, he should spend a few short minutes developing an imaginary report. To do this he must imagine he is his immediate superior, writing a report to his fellow operators describing the mistakes the operator made that killed him on this very operation. He can do this by filling in a quick form, which is easily developed, or if time precludes by giving it verbally to his team members in the CP/ICP. The report should focus on errors in judgment that the operator made and the specifics of the threat he hitherto ignored which resulted in his death. Such activity forces the operator to imagine circumstances that his biases have potentially already set aside or discounted. It may be somewhat morbid but the morbidity can shock the operator into switching from System 1 to System 2 careful, analysis. Remember that the human brain and by corollary the EOD operators brain is lazy and needs encouraging to spend the effort of switching to system 2.
I appreciate that on some operations the tempo of the task does not allow for time to do this – but I certainly think time should be found if something unexpected has occurred. I’d be interested in any feedback on this technique. I have cooking some other mental tools which might be useful to throw into EOD training and I’ll return to those in the future.